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INTRODUCTION: THE AMBIGUITY OF THE CODE
Despite the many advantages which may attend revisions of basic
commercial law such as that undertaken in the Uniform Commerical
Code, there is a danger that proposal of a broad-based modification will
invite commentary on many fronts and so diffuse the attention of both
drafters and critics that the relative importance of a particular change
may not be appreciated. Such appears to have been the case with re-
spect to section 2-306 of the UCC dealing with requirements and out-
put contracts. The section is a significant departure from prior uniform
sales legislation which attempted no codification of the law in this
area.1 If the originality of the codification did not prompt debate, then
* Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B. 1965, Illinois Wesleyan University;
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1. Pre-Code decisions treating output and requirements contracts are discussed
in IA A. CoRaiN, CoTIRa cTs §§ 156-58 & 168 (1963); 3 id. § 569 (1960); 1 S.
WILLisToN, CoNTAcrs § 104A (3d ed. 1957); 3 id. § 421A (3d ed. 1960); 2 S.
WmLisroN, SALES §§ 464(a)-(d) (1948); and Havighurst & Berman, Requirement
and Output Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1932).
HEREINAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
ARTICLE:
A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs (1960) [hereinafter cited as ColuIw];
3 R. DtJsENBERG & L. KING, SALE AND BuLx SALES (1968) [hereinafter cited as
DUESENBERG & KING];
Havighurst & Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts, 27 ILL. L. Rnv. 1
(1932) [hereinafter cited as Havighurst & Berman];
Note, The Construction of Requirements Contracts and the Effect of Estimate
Provisions Therein, 28 COLum. L. 11Ev. 223 (1928) [hereinafter cited as 28 COLum.
L. REv. 223];
Note, Requirements Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 102 U. PA.
L. REv. 654 (1954) [hereinafter cited as 102 U. PA. L. 11Ev. 654].
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it might be expected that controversy would follow from its suscepti-
bility to an interpretation which would upset a developing and seem-
ingly desirable trend in prior law. This has not happened, and the
consequence has been the uncontroversial initiation of a new venture
in statutory control which may seriously undermine the commercial
utility of open-quantity contracts in their traditional forms.
At the basis of the controversy under section 2-306 is the issue of
whether the level of requirements or output under an open-quantity
contract may deviate substantially from contract estimates or from the
prior performance level of the quantity-determining party. Prior to the
Code, there was considerable support, but by no means a consensus,
for the view that the buyer's control over his requirements, and the sel-
ler's discretion with respect to his output, were governed by a good
faith limitation; that is, the party who had it within his power to give
substance to the quantity term had to establish his needs, or output, in
good faith and without artificial manipulation. 2 That there might also
be an objective quantitative limitation-such as the level of prior re-
quirements or output-not only lacked significant support in case law,
but was negated by implication in the formidable commentary of Wil-
liston and Corbin.3 The Code, without question, codified the good
faith requirements and settled the mild dispute evidenced in prior
law. The issue which has generated a divergence of interpretation,
however, is identification of the situations in which the Code establishes
a quantitative limitation upon output and requirements variations. The
text of section 2-306(1) is as follows:
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or
the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements
as may occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably dispro-
portionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to
any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may
be tendered or demanded.4
2. See notes 42-50 infra and accompanying text.
3. 3 CoRBiN § 569; 2 WILLISTON § 464(b).
4. UNmFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-306(1) [hereinafter cited as UCC]. Ex-
cept as otherwise indicated, all references to the Code are to the 1962 Official Text
with Comments (West, 1963).
The text of section 2-306(1) suggests the basis for identifying the types of con-
tracts to which the new Code rules will apply. Such contracts are those which include
'a term which measures quantity by the output of the seller or requirements of the
buyer." The type of contract most clearly within the section is one in which the
obligation of the buyer to buy his requirements or the seller to sell his output is not
subject to modifying language or figures. See, e.g., Whiting Stoker Co. v. Chicago
Stoker Corp., 171 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 915 (1949); Ander-
son v. La Riaconada Country Club, 4 Cal. App. 2d 197, 40 P.2d 571 (1935); Fuchs
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The Code language establishes a limitation for some variations, but it is
not clear whether the limitation applies equally to the four varieties of
fluctuation-that is, increases in requirements, increases in output, de-
creases in requirements, and decreases in output.
v. United Motor Stage Co., 135 Ohio St. 509, 21 N.E.2d 669 (1939); Hickey v.
O'Brien, 123 Mich. 611, 82 N.W. 241 (1900); Elk Ref. Co. v. Falling Rock Channel
Coal Co., 92 W. Va. 479, 115 S.E. 431 (1922). However, where a contract includes
quantity figures with language which suggests an element of indefiniteness, the issue
of the applicability of section 2-306 is raised most sharply. As to one frequently used
clause-that specifying the minimum and maximum quantities which may be ordered-
it has been intimated, in a case not involving the Code, that such an agreement
cannot be viewed as a requirement or output contract, apparently because the parties
have specified quantity limits which will operate irrespective of the buyer's require-
ments or the seller's output. See Monolith Portland Cement Co. v. Douglas Oil Co.,
303 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1962). See also R. ANDERsoN, UNIORlM COMMERCrAL COD-
§ 2.306:3 (1961). Analysis should reveal, however, that the minimum-maximum con-
tract and the requirements or output contract may not be mutually exclusive classifi-
cations. Rather, the standard governing the buyer's right to order quantities between
the stated minimum and maximum must first be determined. Although in a given fac-
tual situation, one party may have unlimited discretion to peg the quantity, see, e.g.,
Diamond Alkali Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., 264 Pa. 304, 107 A. 711 (1919), the
facts surrounding the formation of the contract may indicate that the standard the
parties contemplated was the requirements of the buyer or the output of the seller.
See, e.g., Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 F. 298 (6th
Cir. 1903); National Home Products Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 281
App. Div. 604, 607, 121 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (dicta), aff'd mem. 306 N.Y. 638,
116 N.E.2d 245 (1953).
The text of the Code offers no clear answer to the question of whether section
2-306 applies to a minimum-maximum contract and on that basis might give rise to
the suggestion that it should be read to apply only to contracts which include "a term
which measures the quantity [solely] by output of the seller or requirements of the
buyer." Comment 3, however, gives specific mention to contracts otherwise within the
section in which the parties establish a minimum-maximum range, which should serve
to resolve any doubt that the feature determining applicability of the section is not
the parties' inclusion of definite quantity figures but rather their intent that perform-
ance obligations are to be determined by actual requirements or output. See gener-
ally 54 COLUM. L. RFv. 296 (1954).
Another type of contract which requires an analysis of the parties' intent to
determine the applicability of section 2-306 is that which includes a specific quantity
term qualified by expressions such as "about," "more or less," or "approximately."
See, e.g., Everett Plywood & Door Corp. v. United States, 419 F.2d 425 (Ct. Cl. 1969)
("more or less"); National Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Mann, 251 Mass. 238, 146 N.E.
791 (1925) ("about"); Spotless Co. v. Commercial Trust Co., 215 App. Div. 412, 214
N.Y.S. 10 (1926) ("approximately"). See generally Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 377
(1958). The typical use of such qualifying words is to allow for slight variations at-
tributable to only such conditions as difficulty in counting and immaterial loss in
shipment. Variations of this sort are not judged by the buyer's requirements or
seller's output and the limitations of section 2-306 are not applicable. But a quantity
term so stated may be accompanied by other language which indicates that variations
are to be determined by a standard which comports with the Code definition for a
requirements or output contract. In such a case, the flexibility of the quantity term is
Vol. 1973:5991
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While, as pointed out below, the text of the Code itself is suscepti-
ble to conflicting interpretations, the ambiguity as to the intended
meaning of the section is most clearly illustrated in the explanation
given in the Official Comment. Comment 2 states on the one hand
that, "under this section, the party who will determine quantity is re-
quired to operate his plant. . . so that his output or requirements will
approximate a reasonably foreseeable figure." That may mean that a
quantity limitation with fairly definite contours, such as that suggested
by past levels of need or output, is imposed by the section. The next
sentence, however, quickly refutes that implication: "good faith varia-
tions from prior requirements are permitted even when the variation
may be such as to result in discontinuance." Surely, a provision which
sanctions reduction of requirements to a level of discontinuance im-
poses no limitation at all. But in the next Comment the certainty of
that proposition is dispelled. Estimates of outputs or requirements,
which, according to the text, stand on the same level as prior require-
ments levels,5 are identified "as a center around which the parties in-
tend the variation to occur" and no quantity unreasonably dispropor-
tionate to the estimate or prior performance level may be tendered or
demanded. Thus, it appears that, contrary to what was said in Com-
ment 2, no significant variation from the "center" quantity level, and
certainly not a discontinuance, will be tolerated. Since the estimate or
prior performance level is a center, and not a ceiling or a floor, the im-
plication of Comment 3 is that increases or decreases in quantity be-
yond a reasonably proportionate level will not be permitted.0
considerably greater than in the situations first mentioned. Thus, when the govern-
ment contracted to buy "eight hundred and eighty (880) cords of. . .oak wood, more
or less, as shall be determined to be necessary" by the commander of the military post
to which it was to be delivered, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the
quantity of wood which the buyer must accept was to be determined by his actual re-
quirements. See Brawley v. United States, 96 U.S. 168 (1877). So judged, this type
of quantity term meets the definitional standard of section 2-306 and variations in re-
quirements will be determined according to the limitations of that section.
5. The Code disapproves the tendering or demanding of any quantity "Unrea-
sonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate
to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements." UCC § 2-
306(1) (emphasis added).
Interestingly, Comment 3 speaks only of "estimates" in spite of the textual equa-
tion of estimates and prior output or requirements. No explanation of this word-
ing appears, but it may suggest that the Comment drafters believed the case to be
made regarding estimates was more convincing than that to be made for prior levels of
output or requirements. See UCC § 2-306, Comment 3. See also note 78 infra.
6. The interpretive dilemma generated by the drafters' language may not be
faced in all cases involving variations in requirements or output. If the parties had
not included an estimate of the quantity term in the agreement and if the buyer cannot
[Vol. 1973:599
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This contradiction has fostered divergent interpretations. To
some, the Code presents a limitation, in addition to that flowing from
the good faith standard, upon both increases and decreases in require-
ments or output levels. The most complete statement of this interpre-
tation was made by Professor Honnold for the Study of the Uniform
Commercial Code undertaken for the New York Law Revision Com-
mission.7  While recognizing the ambiguity of the Code text in the sit-
uation where requirements or output are reduced, Professor Honnold
observes that "the fact that the Code provision on disproportionate
volume is introduced by the word 'except' suggests strongly that this
language imposes a qualification on the 'good faith' test." He then hy-
pothesizes a situation in which a dealer in shoes has reduced his orders
from 10,000 to 4,000 pairs a month "due to business conditions." De-
spite the dealer's "obvious 'good faith,"' the Study concludes, "under
the qualifying language of the text [of section 2-306(1)], it would
seem that the buyer would be liable for damages as a result of this 'un-
reasonably disproportionate' reduction of demand . . ... 1 While this
be said to have an established level of "normal ...prior ... output or require-
ments," a variation in quantity can be justified with only a showing that the fluctua-
tion was the result of factors indicative of good faith. The typical case in which
there is no prior quantity level established is one in which the business of the quan-
tity-determining party was new. But situations in which a prior quantity level could
not be devised by a requirements seller or output buyer would appear to be rare.
Indeed, to postulate that a requirements seller or output buyer would object to a
variation in consumption or production presupposes that he had been led to expect a
different level of demand or supply. The basis of that expectation may serve as the
standard against which the relative level of variation could be judged.
Contrary to the suggestion of the Oregon Code Handbook, "normal ... prior
• ..output or requirements" need not be determined solely by reference to the prior
course of dealing between the parties. See OREoN STATE BAR, UNIFOWm COMMERCIAL
CODE HANDBOOK 30 (1963). Neither section 2-306(1) nor its Comment so limit the
meaning of the phrase, and such a construction is undesirable insofar as it removes
from the coverage of the section those situations in which the beginning of the con-
tractual relationship involving an established quantity-determining party preceded by
only a short period the variation in quantity. Even though the Code definition of
prior course of dealing may not be satisfied in such a situation, see UCC § 1-205(1),
the pre-contract requirements or output history would seemingly provide an accurate
guide for application of the exception proviso of section 2-306(1). See R. NotD-
STROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW Op SALEs § 40 (1970). Of course, under the con-
struction urged in this article, the meaning of "normal. . .prior.. . requirements" is
of no consequence in situations in which requirements are reduced in good faith
since the clause is found to be inapplicable. See text accompanying notes 57-93 infra.
7. 1 N.Y. REvisiON COMM'N, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
378-79 (1955).
8. Id. at 378. The conclusion of the Study is qualified by a recognition that
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Official Comment present conflicting interpretations of
the intended application of the section to good faith reductions. Id. at 378-79.
In the appendices of the subsequently published final Report of the Law Revision
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interpretation has been accepted by others,' it has its dissenters. It has
not yet been suggested that increases in requirements or output can be
made free of the quantitative limitation of a contract estimate or past
performance levels. It is, however, felt by some to be unlikely that the
Code presents a limitation, other than good faith, on decreases in re-
quirements or output.10 The apparent basis of these reservations is
the extensive pre-Code judicial and scholarly opinion that unlimited
decreases, even to the point of cessation of the business which deter-
mined quantity level, were permissible."
At least one source has suggested an interpretation which resolves
the tension between the general good faith rule and the textual excep-
tion restricting disproportionate variations.' The exception proviso
would be applicable to all variations in requirements or output, but in
Commission, it is noted that the Commission had considered a suggestion that the
exception clause in subsection (1) of section 2-306 be deleted. It was proposed that
the parties' obligation under section 2-306 be defined by both the good faith standard
and the parties' intention as evidenced by the terms and context of their agreement.
1 N.Y. LAw REvISION COMM', REPORT AND APPENDicES RELATING TO THE UNIVO-RM
COMMERCIAL CODE 374-75 (1956).
9. The Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the Oregon State Bar is
less equivocal in its acceptance of a quantitative limitation on certain requirements
redutions:
Whereas the requirements under all output or requirements contracts
are restricted by the limits of good faith, further limitation of reasonableness
in the extent of variation from anticipation of quantities is imposed where
there is either a prior course of dealing between the parties on the basis of
which output or requirements could be estimated or an estimate of output or
requirements stated in the agreement. OREGON STATE BAR, supra note 6, at
30 (emphasis added).
See also 1 R. ANDERSON, UNInoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.306:5 (1961); 1 W.
HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 51-52
(1964).
10. Support for the view that section 2-306 should be interpreted as not limiting
good faith reductions in quantities has come primarily from student commentators.
See Note, Requirements Contracts: Problems of Drafting and Construction, 78 HAw.
L. REv. 1212, 1220 (1965); Project, A Comparison of California Sales Law and Art.
icle Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 1087, 1137 (1963);
102 U. PA. L. Rnv. 654, 663-66 (1954).
Others have recognized the ambiguity in the statute. See DUESENBERG & KING
§ 4.05[2]; LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: ANALYSIS
OF EFFECrs ON EXISTING KENTUCKY LAW 46 (Research Pub. No. 49, 1957).
11. See, e.g., Oregon Plywood Sales Corp. v. Sutherlin Plywood Corp., 246 F.2d
466 (9th Cir. 1957); Ft. Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass
Corp., 130 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1942); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland
Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630 (10th Cir. 1939); DuBoff v. Matam Corp., 272 App. Div.
502, 71 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1947); 102 U. PA. L. REv. at 662-63, 665-66; 28 COLUM.
L. REv. 223, 229.
12. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CoM'N, ComIONwEALTH OF KENTUCKY, supra note
10, at 46-47. The interpretation advanced is that the exception language of section
2-306(1) "is simply a restatement of the good faith test and not an additional limita-
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determining whether a disproportionate variation was "unreasonably"
so, a court would consider the reason for the reduction and not its
relative size. The court could presumably conclude that a change un-
dertaken in good faith would also, at least for Code-sanctioned pur-
poses, be "reasonably" disproportionate, and thus, permissible under
the Code.13  This approach need not be given serious attention. De-
spite its other ambiguities, the Code language leaves little doubt that
the modifier "unreasonably disproportionate" is intended to describe
the quantity of the reduction and is not addressed to motive or causa-
tion. Indeed, to read "unreasonably disproportionate" to encompass
the qualitative nature of the buyer's action is to render the two clauses
of section 2-306(1) largely redundant, for under this approach, the
exception proviso would do little more than restate the good faith
standard put forth in the first clause of the section. Since the second
proviso is introduced by the word "except," the drafters can be consid-
ered to have intended to provide a different result in situations within
the exception. 4 Hence, the ambiguity of section 2-306(1) cannot be
readily dispelled.
The purpose of this article is to present an interpretative frame-
work which will resolve the conflict in the Comment and clarify the
ambiguity of the text.' 5  The theses of this analysis are three. First,
the basis of any attempt at analysis should be the commercial function
of requirements and output contracts. It can be assumed that codifica-
tion did not effectuate a drastic limitation on that function, but rather
was reflective of it. In particular, it will be assumed that the statute
is sensitive to those characteristics which distinguish open-quantity
contracts-those for the sale of output or the purchase of require-
tion upon quantitative variations." Id. at 46. The limits of this argument are recog-
nized and discussed in 102 U. PA. L. REv. 654, 663-65.
13. See WHrrl & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-8, at 105.
14. See 1 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N REPORT, supra note 7, at 378 (1972).
15. Except as expressed in the Comment, the legislative history of the text of
section 2-306(1) provides no insight into the intended application of the exception
proviso. Indeed, the striking feature of the background of the section is a nearly
complete absence of modification from its original form. Except for the addition of
one minor, nonsubstantive phrase in the fall of 1950, the section appears in the 1962
Official Edition of the Code in precisely the same form as that version first made
public in April of 1944. See UNIFORM RvisED SALES ACT § 30 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1944). This first draft did not include a Comment, although some other
sections were accompanied by the drafters' statement. The Comment to the section,
however, was written shortly after the draft was released. See UCC § 2-306, Com-
ment (May, 1949 draft). Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Comment remain in substan-
tially the same form as they first appeared. Paragraph 2 was substantially expanded
after the 1949 draft, and the possible significance of this alteration is discussed below.
See notes 78-93 infra and accompanying text.
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ments-from the more traditional fixed-quantity contract. Secondly,
and relatedly, because the rule of section 2-306 is to be a general
one applicable to a variety of contracts, it must be interpreted to meet
the common needs of these contracts. It is, therefore, preferably gen-
eral in scope. The danger of too great a specificity is that the legiti-
mate commercial expectations of a party will be subordinated to the
sweep of a statutory provision which was designed to cure unrelated
problems. In requirements and output contracts, the intentions and
expectations of the parties are likely to vary considerably from con-
tract to contract because of significant differences in the parties' ability
to predict their requirements or output level. 16 Thus, it is preferable
to frame statutory control to cover only those elements which are clearly
shared and to leave the remaining features of the contract subject to
the design of the parties' expectations and intentions.
The third thesis is that despite the inherent conflict of the Com-
ment, it is instructive on the question of the likely intention of those
who followed section 2-306 through the several drafts of the Code.
Because of limitations on the extent to which the Comments should
control the interpretation of the Code,17 an analysis based on the Coin-
16. Some courts have questioned whether open-quantity contracts can be subject
to uniform rules. See William C. Atwater & Co. v. Terminal Coal Corp., 115 F.2d
887, 888 (1st Cir. 1940): "Requirements contracts cannot all be lumped together in a
single category and given an identical legal effect." This view may merely be a recog-
nition that a particular effort should be made to determine the intention of the parties
to an open-quantity contract. While the process of judicial interpretation of con-
tracts is generally premised on such a rule, output and requirements arise in such
diverse contexts as to justify greater attention to the background of the agreement.
The Uniform Commercial Code provides a number of avenues for resort to the context
of an agreement. See, e.g., UCC §§ 1-102(3), -205.
17. Even if the conflict in the Comment is resolved, a question remains as to
the weight to be given the Comment. Authorities disagree on the persuasiveness they
are willing to assign the Comments. An early draft of the Code itself stated that the
Comments "may be consulted in the construction and application of this Act but if
text and comment conflict, text controls . . . ." UCC § 1-102(3)(f) (1952 draft).
However, the present version of the Code contains no textual reference to the
Comments.
The Comments cannot be categorized as legislative history for the Code since
"[i]n some states the revised Comments had not yet been drafted at the time of the
Code's adoption. In others it is highly doubtful that the Comments were laid before
the legislators in the form of a committee report explaining the [Code] legislation
." A. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, CASES AND MArTRIAIS ON COMMERCIAL LAW
8-10 (2d ed. 1968). In addition, the drafting of the Comments was neither under-
taken at the request of the adopting legislature, nor subject to its review. The Com-
ments fail also as a precise record of the thoughts and purposes of those who created
the model text. Many Comments were prepared or modified either later in time than
the accompanying Code text or by an author other than the author of the Code text.
Professors Farnsworth and Honnold suggest that the Comments be given "at
[Vol. 1973:599
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ment may not be determinative in itself. It may, however, be persua-
sive when viewed against the background of the policy suggested by the
nature of open-quantity contracts.
THE FUNCTION OF REQUIREMENTS AND OUTPUT CONTRACTS
Section 2-306 represents a first attempt to identify the common
bases of open-quantity contracts. While the operation of the rule may
be modified by agreement,'" the substance of the section is intended
to have general application and, therefore, is presumably responsive to
the role which requirements and output contracts fulfill in commercial
transactions. If it can be accepted that section 2-306 was drafted in
light of the commercial role of such contracts, examination of those
functions should provide a general guide for interpretation of the draft-
ers' product. A statute which expresses this function may also reflect
policy-based limitations, such as a concern for the impact of drastic,
though unanticipated, quantity variations. While the need and prece-
least as much weight as an able article or treatise construing the Code." Id. at 10.
They probably deserve greater deference, however. The Comment authors, even where
not the actual authors of the accompanying text, were at least intimately involved in
the discussions surrounding the various Code drafts and were in a position to influence
and be influenced by the Code drafters. Also, while a treatise author may be in the
position of advocating a particular interpretation of the now formalized Code, the
Comment writer is concerned primarily with explaining the intentions of the drafting
body.
Courts have been relatively unconcerned with this academic debate and seem
ready to cite any Comment which seems reasonably compatible with the text; see, e.g.,
In re Yale Express System, Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966), or which reasonably
expands the application of the text; see, e.g., Warren's Kiddie Shoppe, Inc. v. Casual
Slacks, Inc., 120 Ga. App. 578, 171 S.E.2d 643 (1969). And where the conflict be-
tween text and Comment is real, the Comment is likely to be disregarded. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966); Zinni v. One Township Line Corp.,
36 Pa. D. & C.2d 297 (Del. County C.P. 1965). But see Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383,
405, 221 A.2d 320, 333 (concurring and dissenting opinion). This approach seems
fairly close to the use of the Comments suggested in the 1952 draft. Since both
common sense and practicality support this construction, the reticence of the drafters to
continue their earlier view is curious. In any case, the present discussion accepts the
Comments as legitimate and persuasive authority for interpretation of the Code where
there is no clear conflict between text and Comments.
18. UCC § 1-102(3) provides in part: "The effect of provisions of this Act may
be varied by agreement . . . ." The purpose of this section is to state "affirmatively
at the outset that freedom of contract is a principle of the Code . . . ." Id., Com-
ment 2. It is also provided, however, that an obligation of good faith cannot be re-
moved by agreement UCC § 1-102(3). Hence, the parties cannot vary the general
rule of section 2-306 that the obligation imposed by an open-quantity contract is de-
termined by "such actual output or requirements as may occur in good faith . . . :'
But even as to the good faith criteria, "the parties may by agreement determine the
standards by which the performance of such obligation... is to be measured if such
standards are not manifestly unreasonable." UCC § 1-102(3).
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dent for such limitations are considered later, this initial inquiry is un-
encumbered by these policy choices, since they, too, must be responsive
to function.
This discussion will attempt to define the utility of open-quantity
contracts as a form for commercial transactions. Such a definition em-
phasizes the reasons why a contracting party would choose this type of
arrangement rather than the more typical fixed-quantity contract. In
addition, there will be an identification of the extent to which the re-
quirements or output contract offers distinct advantages in particular
situations, advantages which should be preserved if they conform to le-
gal policy.
The present analysis will presume a true requirements or output
contract--one for which the sole determinant of quantity is actual re-
quirements or actual output, upon which no significant artificial limita-
tion is imposed by judicial or statutory rule. To simplify the analysis,
it will also be assumed that the party whose activity will establish quan-
tity is one who produces a commodity and is thus concerned about the
conditions under which he secures equipment and materials and the
condition of the market in which he sells his product. While the cases
suggest that other factual patterns are often prominent in litigation,19
the ultimate analysis will not differ. For purpose of illustration, then,
it will be posited that the requirements buyer is a manufacturer of a
product which is sold in a market of noticeable competition. The
buyer requires materials and equipment from various sources and must
compete with other buyers of these same commodities. He may seek
19. For instance, sellers may be producers of natural commodities, see, e.g., South-
west Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630 (10th Cir,
1939) (natural gas); Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Consolidated Coal & Coke Co.,
276 F. 661 (8th Cir. 1921) (coal); Transcontinental Petroleum Co. v. Interocean
Oil Co., 262 F. 278 (8th Cir. 1919) (crude oil); Tuttle-Chapman Coal Co. v. Coaldale
Fuel Co., 136 Iowa 382, 113 N.W. 827 (1907) (coal); Fayette-Kanawha Coal Co. v.
Lake & Export Coal Corp., 91 W. Va. 132, 112 S.E. 222 (1922) (coal); or crops,
see, e.g., Oldershaw v. Kingsbaker Bros., 53 Cal. App. 667, 200 P. 729 (1921) (toma-
toes); Rosenberg v. Rogers, 44 Cal. App. 196, 186 P. 366 (1919) (figs); Liberty
Brand Canning Co. v. Denby, 30 Del. 465, 108 A. 142 (1918) (tomatoes); Ross-
Vaughan Tobacco Co. v. Johnson, 182 Ky. 325, 206 S.W. 487 (1918) (tobacco);
Propst v. William Hanley Co., 94 Ore. 397, 185 P. 766 (1919) (hay); or animals,
see, e.g., Longfellow v. Huffman, 55 Ore. 481, 104 P. 961 (1909) (lambs). Also,
open-quantity buyers may be jobbers or distributors. See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Pensa-
cola Maritime Corp., 279 F. 19 (5th Cir. 1922); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. H.
Neuer Glass Co., 253 F. 161 (6th Cir. 1918); Crane v. C. Crane & Co., 105 F. 869
(7th Cir. 1901); T.W. Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 237 F. 278 (S.D. Cal.
1916); Trainor v. Buchanan Coal Co., 154 Minn. 204, 191 N.W. 431 (1923);
Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter Cooper's Glue Factory, 231 N.Y. 459, 132 N.E. 148
(1921).
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to have some of his supplies furnished on a requirements basis. Like-
wise, our illustrative output seller produces a commodity. He is sub-
ject to fluctuations in the cost of his materials and equipment, and, but
for the output contract, he would compete with others in the market
in which his product is sold.
At the outset, it must be accepted that this is an area in which
generalizations are particularly susceptible to significant qualification.
A review of business practices reveals that, in fact, open-quantity con-
tracts are used for a variety of reasons and that the function of such
contracts is often not viewed in terms of a single, irreducible proposi-
tion. This variety also leads to observations which seem contradictory.
Thus, in a particular situation it can be said that a buyer chose to frame
his agreement as a requirements contract, rather than a fixed-quantity
contract, because his needs fluctuated considerably and he would be
unable to determine in advance the quantity of a particular commod-
ity which he would ultimately consume. On the other hand, in a dif-
ferent fact situation a requirements contract may be attractive to the
seller for the opposite reason. On the basis of past experience, the
buyer's requirements may be sufficiently predictable that the seller en-
ters the contract with the expectation that he will be able to devote a
predetermined portion of his production to the contract and thus save
the marketing expenses which would ordinarily result from the disposi-
tion of these goods.
The versatility of the open-quantity contract should suggest, then,
that any attempt to identify the function of such arrangements must
take the form of a catalogue of the objectives which will be perused by
the buyer and seller in various contexts. Once this categorization is
completed, an attempt can be made to isolate whatever unifying princi-
ples appear from the variety of commercial objectives identified. The
following analysis is in this format.
Production Flexibility
A true requirements contract allows the buyer to adjust his intake
of materials and supplies to fluctuations in markets in which he sells
his products or in the markets from which he secures supplies.20 As
demand for his product decreases, for example, the requirements buyer
is both able to reduce his production and to avoid the economic burden
of committing capital to unneeded supplies. Similarly, if demand for
his product increases, he is able to adjust his production immediately
20. See Havighurst & Berman, 1-2; 102 U. PA. L. Rnv. 654.
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to the extent his supplies are furnished on a requirements basis. Also,
if costs for labor and equipment increase to the point of seriously im-
pairing profitability, the buyer can respond by reducing production.
The buyer under a fixed-quantity contract, of course, does not
necessarily lack a capacity to respond to changes in his markets. The
point can be made, however, that the fixed-quantity purchaser is more
restricted in his production options. If he secures his supplies through
a series of fixed-quantity contracts, he runs the risk, on the one hand,
that he will over-purchase. A subsequent contraction in his product
market or a price increase in his market for other supplies may leave
him in a position in which he is legally obligated to accept goods which
he does not need immediately. The resources which are necessary to
meet that commitment might have more profitably been applied to
other aspects of his business. On the other hand, the fixed-quantity
purchaser at other times may find that his fixed-quantity arrangements
have resulted in his purchasing insufficient quantities. When demand
for his product increases, he can, of course, enter additional contracts to
satisfy his needs. But in doing so, he faces the risk of a price increase,
a risk which could be avoided, or at least controlled within manageable
limits, by an appropriately drafted requirements contract.
In short, a requirements contract can serve as a risk-shifting de-
vice. By his utilization of this form of agreement, the buyer can shift
to the requirements seller some of the risks of the buyer's business.
Among the most important of these is the risk that the market in which
the buyer sells his product will contract.21 And the seller who agrees
to a fixed-price requirements arrangement also accepts the risk that the
market price for his commodity will increase and thus he must forego
potential opportunities for more profitable sales to other buyers. 22
The extent to which a buyer will seek a requirements contract for
the purpose of preserving production flexibility may ultimately depend
upon the predictability of his future needs. For the buyer who has a
highly stable demand for a particular commodity, the requirements
contract offers little in terms of risk-spreading that could not be se-
cured from a series of fixed-quantity arrangements. As discussed be-
low, a buyer in this situation may select the open-quantity contract for
other reasons. But the buyer who faces variable supply needs may find
21. See, e.g., Royal Paper Box ACo. v. E.R. Apt Shoe Co., 290 Mass. 207, 210,
195 N.E. 96, 98 (1935); 28 CoLTrm. L. REv. 223.
22. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949).
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a substantial advantage in avoiding the more rigid commitment of a
fixed-quantity contractual arrangement.
While the flexibility in production which is assured by a require-
ments contract may offer a substantial advantage to the buyer, such ar-
rangements must offer some inducement to the seller to accept the risks
which the buyer avoids. The nature of the incentive for the seller will
ultimately depend upon his perception of the extent of the risk which
he confronts. In the situation in which there is considerable uncer-
tainty as to the buyer's requirements, the means which the seller will
most likely use is a price adjustment; he can use the fact of his risk-
assumption as a basis for bargaining for a selling price above that of
the then established market price.23 While this would seem to be the
most typically applicable means for compensating the seller, there are
other features of the arrangement which may be attractive. As the
rate of the requirements buyer's consumption becomes more predicta-
ble, price adjustments are less likely and these other considerations pre-
sumably will play a greater role. The seller may anticipate, for exam-
ple, that the buyer will buy the contract goods in sufficiently large
quantities that he is compensated for the risk of a quantity fluctua-
tion.24  The guaranteed market of the requirements contract will re-
lieve the seller of the burden of pursuing other markets and may yield
a substantial reduction in selling expenses.25 Similarly, a predictable
demand will assist the seller in planning for his business and permit
the more efficient allocation of resources.
From the seller's perspective, the requirements contract also has
the effect of excluding other competitors from the outlet which he has
secured. Where the seller already holds a dominant market position,
this attribute may have serious antitrust implications. 6 In other situa-
23. See Shader Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 276 F.2d 1, 7 (Ct. Cl. 1960);
3 CoRmN § 569, at 341. Cf. 2 WILLISTON § 464(d).
24. See Havighurst & Berman 2.
25. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949). See also
26 IND. LJ. 111, 113-14 (1950).
26. A requirements contract may violate the antitrust laws when the market
position thereby acquired by the seller in a given area is such that it would effectively
foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected. See
Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). See generally Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nash-
ville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293
(1949); Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe Am. Corp., 201 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1953);
Aluminum Shapes, Inc. v. K-A-Liquidating Co., 290 F. Supp. 356 (W.D. Pa. 1968);
United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951), afj'd per
curiam, 343 U.S. 922 (1952); P. AREEDA, ANnmusr ANALYsis 488-89 (1956); Bok,
The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under the
Clayton Act, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 267; Helman, Partial Requirements Contracts Under
Section Three of the Clayton Act, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 288 (1960); Lockhart & Sacks,
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tions, the effect of the open-quantity contract in restricting competition
may be quite desirable, for a seller who is a new entrant into an es-
tablished product market may be attracted by the protection which the
requirements contract provides. If the market is already occupied by
established sellers, a prospective competitor may be unwilling to enter
it unless he secures a protected market, such as that provided by a re-
quirements buyer with a stable demand. When the seller has secured
such a contract, the decision to commit resources to the development of
a market position can be made with an assurance that a demand will
exist for the seller's product. In this situation, the seller exchanges the
risk of his own lack of competitiveness during the start-up period for
what he may perceive as a lesser risk that his prediction of the buyer's
demands will prove to be inaccurate.
Much of the analysis concerning the importance of production
flexibility to the requirements buyer can also be applied to the seller
under an output contract. Such a contract, from the perspective of
the seller, has the attraction of insuring a constant demand for his
product. It is true, as accepted by traditional analysis, that the advan-
tage of such a contract likely to be given highest priority by the seller
is the savings of marketing costs which flows from the assured de-
mand.17  Indeed, the articulated expectations of the seller are likely
to emphasize this cost-saving feature. If the arrangement is a true
output contract, however, it will afford the seller greater freedom to
control the production levels of his operation than might be available
if his sales were limited to fixed-quantity orders. If the seller's only
obligation is to sell his output, production volume can be adjusted to
insure that the goods are produced at a level which achieves maximum
profitability in his plant. If the cost of supplies increases and it is nec-
essary to increase the volume of production to further spread these
costs, the seller is assured that a market will exist for the commodities
produced. Were the seller's product marketed only through fixed-
quantity contracts, the desired result could be achieved only if the
seller could locate or stimulate demand from other buyers. If produc-
tion of the commodity becomes unprofitable due to material shortages
or increased costs, the seller will reduce his output, assuming that he is
permitted to do so by applicable legal constraints. If he were bound
The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements
Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 H~Av. L. RFv. 913 (1952).
27. See Havighurst & Berman 2; 102 U. PA. L. RFv. 654. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949); Stockhausen, The Commercial and Anti-
Trust Aspects of Term Requirements Contracts, 23 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 412 (1948).
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under a series of fixed-quantity contracts, he would not have this op-
tion and would be forced to continue production to the extent neces-
sary to meet pre-existing commitments. Because of this and other ad-
vantages to the seller, the buyer is likely to be able to secure a more
favorable price for the commodity sold than would be available in the
open market at the time of the contract. A basic assumption of this
arrangement is, however, that the potential for profit will prompt the
seller to maintain production whenever feasible.28  Hence, the buyer's
assessment of the risk he assumes-and, thus, his desire for a price
advantage-reflect the weight of this consideration as well as such fac-
tors as the seller's prior output levels, the capacity of his plant, and the
availability of his supplies.
Thus, a central feature of both output and requirements contracts
in their pristine forms is the flexibility which is afforded the quantity-
determining party in the operation of his business. When business re-
versals arise, the party is in a position to adjust his production to mini-
mize the risk of financial loss. Similarly, the open-quantity arrange-
ment allows the quantity-determining party to respond when there is an
opportunity for greater profits.2 9 Thus, in addition to other advan-
tages, the requirements buyer or output seller retains a capacity to re-
spond to changes in the profitability of his business, and thereby
achieves an objective which is central to any commercial operation.
While the quantity-determining party in these capacities will often
trade off other advantages-usually price-to maintain the desired flex-
ibility, resort to the open-quantity contract offers greater flexibility of
business operation than would exist under fixed-quantity arrangements
in which obligation to accept some goods-or right to demand additional
quantities-is predetermined.
Other Functions
Open-quantity contracts serve commercial functions other than as-
suring the quantity-determining party flexibility in establishing the pro-
duction level of his business. These include minimization of supply
28. See note 54 infra.
29. The cause of decreased profitability might be the open-quantity contract itself,
when it is a fixed-price contract with a contract price above the prevailing market.
There has been a general rejection of the idea that a legitimate function of an open-
quantity contract is to allow avoidance of the contract merely because its terms become
unfavorable. Rather, the cause of a change in the prospect for profitability must
have origins independent of the contract itself. See, e.g., Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v.
Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 F. 298 (6th Cir. 1903); Note, supra note 10, at 1222-
23; 102 U. PA. L. Rnv. 654, 658-60.
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risks other than those identified above, achievement of greater opera-
tional efficiency, and reduction of direct operational costs. In particu-
lar cases, these other functions may be the feature which ultimately at-
tracts a party to the arrangement, although it is often the case that this
contractual form is used to satisfy a mixture of motives which encom-
passes both the flexibility function and one or more of those discussed
herein. There is likely to be considerable variation in the degree to
which each of these functions is represented in the articulated expecta-
tions of particular buyers and sellers. 30 And, in many cases, a function
may be assumed but not expressly identified by the quantity-determin-
ing party. In other situations, the circumstances of the contractual set-
ting will suggest that a function is not operative.
Minimization of supply risks. For a particular manufacturer,
there may be a substantial risk that the availability of material will be
restricted.3 1 The cause may be supply limitations which exist irrespec-
tive of price, as in the case of scarce natural resources, or which are re-
lated to the presence of unpredictably fluctuating cost. By resort to a
requirements contract, the purchaser can surmount these supply risks.
The buyer is locked into a source of supply and assured that the seller
will not market a product of limited availability to other buyers.
30. For example, in some situations the choice of a requirements contract must
be explained primarily from the perspective of the seller. The requirements con-
tracts found in merchandise and food franchising are often of this sort. The require-
ments obligation which the franchisee-buyer assumes may be only an incidental conse-
quence of his desire to secure other advantages which flow from association with the
franchisor. Hence, the primary attraction to the franchisee may be the opportunity to
use the franchisor's trademark or other evidence of goodwill; to secure the fran-
chisor's assistance in business management and product promotion; or to receive
preferences with respect to particular territories or customers. In order to secure
these opportunities, the franchisee may not be able or inclined to bargain separately
about the extent of his requirements obligation. Cf. Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract
Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellation, 1967 DuKE LJ. 465, 468 n.8. Even
where this is the case, the franchise requirements contract will fulfill for the buyer
some of the functions identified in this article. Thus, the buyer will be able to
shift some market risks to the franchisor and his contract may also increase his
operational efficiency and produce some direct cost savings. And, obviously, a con-
stant source of supply will be secured. But the role of the requirements contract in
this context is often more realistically viewed in terms of the seller's objectives. The
seller may impose the contract in order to preserve the integrity of his product or
trademark or merely to limit the franchisor's right to purchase from other sources-
considerations which may be subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws. See gener-
ally D. THoMPsON, FRANcmsn OPERATIONS Am ANx mmusT (1971) and authorities cited
in note 26 supra.
31. See Wilson v. Corrugated Kraft Containers, 117 Cal. App. 749, 256 P.2d
1012 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953) (scarcity of boxes due to military demands); Nickel v.
Theresa Farmer's Co-op Ass'n, 247 Wis. 412, 20 N.W.2d 117 (1945).
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Where the buyer's concern is with future fluctuations in market price,
a fixed-price requirements contract will provide protection from that un-
certainty.
It should be apparent that a fixed-quantity contract could also be
used to preserve a source of supply. The utility of such an arrange-
ment, however, would approximate that of the open-quantity contract
only in the situation in which the buyer could predict his needs with
precision. Where the buyer is attempting to meet short-term supply
needs, he may very well find that the requirements contract offers no
particular advantage in securing his supply source. If the buyer's con-
cern for the quality or availability of his supplies extends over a longer
term, however, the element of predictability is less certain. In this sit-
utation the choice of a requirements arrangement can serve both to se-
cure the needed supplies and permit flexibility in the rate of consump-
tion. The buyer could, of course, attempt to satisfy his long-term re-
quirements by a series of fixed-quantity contracts in which a new con-
tract was negotiated as his supply needs became susceptible to a rea-
sonably accurate projection. Such an approach would, however, of-
fer a number of disadvantages. In addition to the possibility of an
over- or under-purchase of goods, the buyer would not only incur
transactions costs-which, as explained below, include the cost of
seeking out and negotiating with sellers-but would also expose himself
to price increases. A requirements contract could be used to avoid these
difficulties.
The seller under an output contract also gains advantages in the
market from which he secures supplies. The output contract assures
a constant demand, a feature which is not present where the seller re-
lies on fixed-quantity sales to dispose of his production. To meet that
demand, the seller can produce his product at an even rate and his sup-
ply needs will have greater stability than would exist were he not com-
peting in a guaranteed market. He can use this feature of a constant
and predictable consumption level as a basis for bargaining for an ad-
vantageous price arrangement with his suppliers. The supplier shares
in the advantage of the output contract by receiving some protection
against his own over-production.
Increased operational efficiency. The ability of the output seller
to operate his plant more efficiently is apparent: the seller's rate of
production can be stabilized, thus insuring efficient use of his labor
force, equipment, and physical facilities.3 2  Unlike the seller who
32. See Stockhausen, supra note 27, at 414,
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must respond to a varying demand, the output seller can make ex-
tensive use of short- and long-term planning for the most productive
operation of his business. The buyer under a requirements contract
can also increase his operational efficiency and may commit himself to
such an arrangement with that objective. He is assured that his sup-
ply of materials will be constant, which in turn allows him greater con-
trol of his production schedule than would exist if he were forced to
secure his supplies through periodic negotiations with suppliers. Vari-
ations in the availability of the material, which might otherwise affect
the buyer's ability to arrive at an even production schedule, are avoided.
In addition, the buyer may substantially enhance the predictability of
his cost if he can secure his requirements on a fixed-price basis. By
isolating some of his costs in advance of production, he can plan for
more efficient allocation of his other resources. Consistent with a
theme developed above, similar results could be achieved under fixed-
quantity contracts only where supply needs could be accurately pro-
jected, a condition not likely to be found over a long term.
Decreased direct operational cost. While increased operational
efficiency will produce cost savings, cost reduction of a more direct sort
can be identified as flowing from an open-quantity arrangement. Once
a source of supply is secured under an open-quantity contract, the re-
quirements buyer no longer needs to devote time or personnel to
searching out suppliers and negotiating materials contracts. Moreover,
a buyer who attempts to satisfy uncertain supply needs by fixed-
quantity contracts is likely to make purchases in quantities greater than
those needed for immediate consumption in order to minimize both
transactions costs and the risk of price variations. The resulting ex-
penditures for storage and maintenance of inventory could be more
closely controlled by a requirements arrangement in which the level of
periodic orders reflects short-term needs.83
The cost reduction which the output seller experiences is more cer-
tain. Indeed, it is this function which is often regarded as that which
attracts the seller to an output contract. Assured of a steady demand
for his production, he need not incur the costs which are usually nec-
essary to stimulate and respond to demand.34 Thus, he need not ad-
vertise or otherwise promote his product and he need not employ per-
sonnel to negotiate and administer sales contracts.
33. See id. at 413.
34. See authorities cited in note 27 supra.
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Relationship of the Various Functions
The above analysis suggests that a party may negotiate an open-
quantity contract to take advantage of one or more of the functions of
such arrangements. The question can be raised as to whether, for pur-
poses of policy analysis, any ordering can be ascribed to the relative
importance of the various functions. It must be accepted that a prior-
ity which a quantity-determining party articulates will reflect the pe-
culiar features of the commercial setting in which he operates and, thus,
may not be susceptible to generalization. Nonetheless, in terms of the
general commercial role fulfilled by open-quantity contracts, it appears
that the predominant function is that which permits the quantity-de-
termining party flexibility in determining his level of consumption or
output, for it is this feature which ultimately distinguishes this contrac-
tual form from the more typical fixed-quantity arrangement.
As has been suggested above, the distinctiveness of other functions
of open-quantity contracts is dependent upon retention by the require-
ments buyer or output seller of some freedom in establishing quantity
levels. Thus, a buyer who seeks to relieve himself of the costs of ne-
gotiating and administering supply contracts will have a rational basis
for choosing a requirements contract only if he is unable to predict his
consumption needs with precision. If his needs were certain, as where
he is purchasing for a single, short-term project, whatever operational
cost savings would result from a requirements contract could be read-
ily duplicated by a carefully planned fixed-quantity agreement. A
buyer might, of course, choose a requirements contract in this situation,
but it could not be said that a distinctive commercial objective was ful-
filled by that decision.
It is suggested then that even when the articulated priority of pro-
duction flexibility is not great, the quantity-determining party will
likely enter the contract on the unstated assumption that he retains con-
trol of his requirements or output. The capacity of a party to secure
an advantage from minimization of supply risks, increases in opera-
tional efficiency, and cost reduction depends ultimately upon his ability
to control the quantities which fulfill the contractual obligation. If
quantities can be determined according to needs or output, then the
utility of the other features of the contract can be maximized.
In large measure, this analysis might appear to be little more than
an elaboration of the obvious: when parties choose to enter an agree-
ment which does not specify a definite quantity, they apparently assume
that one party will have some power to define the obligation under the
contract. Where the referent for determining quantity is one party's
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requirements or output, without greater specification, whatever free-
dom is reserved must have been reserved to that party. Despite its ob-
viousness, the point is of considerable importance because it can
readily be obscured in judicial and legislative policy-making. It is clear
in some cases, for example, that the most immediate attraction of an
open-quantity contract for one party was some reason other than the
desire for wide-ranging discretion in determining the quantity which
would fulfill the contractual obligation. A typical example of such an
alternative motive is where the scarcity of a given commodity motivates
a user of that commodity to enter into a requirements contract to as-
sure his supply.35 This type of situation is readily susceptible to an
interpretation which subverts the more fundamental function of open-
quantity agreements, that of reserving to one party considerable leeway
in defining the obligation imposed, in that the exigencies of the par-
ticular case may result in a more narrow judicial focus. To avoid that
result, and thus to place open-quantity contracts in their proper per-
spective, the element of quantity flexibility should be the sine qua non
in determinations of legal policy in this area.
Contract Law and the Function of Open-Quantity Contracts
The above discussion with respect to the functions of open-quan-
tity contracts can be read as a strong statement of the desirability of
these arrangements for the quantity-determining party. Yet, affording
the requirements buyer or an output seller production flexibility repre-
sents an extreme risk for the party who must supply the goods or pur-
chase the output. Such contracts, if enforced to the letter without
equitable restraint, may produce instances of severe oppression, verg-
ing on the unconscionable-as where unforeseen circumstances result
in output far in excess of the reasonable expectations of the "locked-
in" buyer.36 Additionally, a large investment in production equipment
for the requirements seller or a structure for goods distribution for the
output buyer may be left idle because of a change in the other party's
perception of market conditions. Consideration of this potential detri-
ment has promoted limitations in several forms.
35. See, e.g., Wilson v. Corrugated Kraft Containers, 117 Cal. App. 749, 256 P.2d
1012 (Dist. CL App. 1953) (period of great scarcity in supply of corrugated boxes
caused wholesale jobber to enter requirements contract).
36. See, e.g., Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976 (S.D.N.Y.
1917), where the court's rigid enforcement of an output contract forced the reluctant
buyer to purchase an unforeseeably large amount of cinders, which were the by-product
of stepped-up war production. See notes 92-93 infra and accompanying text. It is
doubtful that the decision would be upheld under current Code analysis. See notes
107-08 infra and accompanying text.
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Limitation by agreement. Many limitations are added by the
parties themselves and are either expressed in the particular terms of
their agreement or are implied from the circumstances surrounding the
transaction. Thus, there may be resort to a clause specifying the mar-
ket conditions which serve to limit responsiveness or similar devices.
But the particularized nature of these arrangements removes them from
the class of open-quantity contracts which should be covered by a gen-
eral statutory rule and their varieties will not be discussed. It should
be noted, however, that the Uniform Commercial Code specifically in-
vites the parties to structure their own arrangement with attention to the
general directives of section 2-306.17 This is, of course, an implicit
recognition that the rule of the section may not be adaptable to all the
varieties of situations in which resort is made to the open-quantity con-
tract. But in addition, the invitation for individualized variations sug-
gests that the contracting parties have considerable control over the po-
tential harshness of their agreement.
Limitation by law: The common law approach. In light of the
potentially devastating results for the promisee under a requirements
or output commitment, it might be thought that judicial construction
would lead to appropriate limitations upon the quantity of goods re-
quired under these agreements. In fact, there was significant support
for the opposite view: that the party who had bargained for production
flexibility should be allowed to take full advantage of that feature. 8
As recently as the latest revision of his treatise, Professor Corbin had no
great difficulty with this result, although his footnotes belie the staunch-
ness of the position taken in his text. In summarizing what courts had
done with respect to decreases in requirements and output, for exam-
ple, he wrote:
Does the buyer promise "by implication!' that he will have any needs or
requirements, that he will send in orders during the whole stated period
for the amount of goods that he has used in the past or. . . that he will
not fail to keep his business running with its accustomed needs and re-
quirements? . . . . [Djoes the seller promise by implication that he will
have any "output", that he will run his factory or work his mine, with
diligence according to past custom, or at all?39
37. See UCC § 1-102(3).
38. See, e.g., text accompanying note 99 infra.
39. 3 CoanNn, § 569. See also Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration,
34 YALE L.J 571, 579-83 (1925).
Williston observed that "It is possible . . . that the agreement of the buyer is to
take all the goods that his business, if maintained under substantially the same condi-
tions as exist at the time of the bargain, would require; and then, even if he sold his
business or discontinued it, he would still be bound to continue purchases. This inter-
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In both of these classes of cases, the courts have generally answered
the questions in the negative.40
And Professor Corbin accepts their response. He has no difficulty with
the reasonableness of the assumption that the promisee will be willing
to bear the risk of there being no output or requirements. In his view,
the promisee "can adjust his prices in proportion to the risk.""'
As Professor Corhin's note material recognizes, and apparently ap-
proves, many common law courts were uneasy with this unbridled dis-
cretion in the quantity-determining party.42 A doctrine which gave
expression to this concern was that which required that changes in re-
quirements or output be undertaken in good faith. From many of the
contexts in which this phrase is discussed, it appears that its assertion
was a response to the fear which plagued earlier courts that mere whim
could guide the establishment of quantity levels.48 Although the
doubts which the earlier courts had had about the mutuality of these
contracts were generally settled,44 the good faith requirement was a
pretation, however, does not seem the proper one in ordinary cases where the buyer
agrees to take what he 'requires,' 'needs,' or 'wants.'" 2 WILLISTON § 464(b).
40. See, e.g., cases cited note 11 supra and note 96 infra.
41. 3 CoRiN § 569, at 341.
42. See id. § 569 n.93.
43. See New York Cent. Ironworks Co. v. United States Radiator Co., 174 N.Y.
331, 335, 66 N.E. 967-68 (1903): "[We do not mean that the plaintiff had the right,
under the contract, to order goods to any amount. . . . The obligation of good faith
and fair dealing . . . is implied in every contract of this character. The plaintiff
could not use the contract for the purpose of speculation in a rising market . .. .
In Fayette-Kanawha Coal Co. v. Lake & Export Coal Corp., 91 W. Va. 132,
112 S.E. 222 (1922) an output buyer argued that the output contract lacked mu-
tuality because the seller "could easily avoid its obligation by simply closing down its
plant." The court rejected this construction, holding that the seller was under the
"obligation to operate these mines in the ordinary way, in good faith . . . ." 91 W.
Va. at 139-40, 112 S.E. at 225. See also Shader Contractors, Inc. v. United States,
276 F.2d 1, 4 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
44. See 1A CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 156, at 30 n.22 (1963). But see Comment, Mu-
tuality of Obligation in Wisconsin Requirements Contracts: A Suggested Approach
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1954 Wis. L. RIv. 684.
The judicial concern for the mutuality of the obligations assumed under an open-
quantity contract has been the subject of extensive commentary. See generally Corbin,
supra note 39, at 579-83; DuBSENBERG & KING § 4.05[l]; 2 WILLISTON §§ 464(a)-
(d); Havighurst & Berman; Lavery, The Doctrine of Bailey v. Austrian, 10 MINN.
L. REv. 584 (1926); Patterson, "Illusory" Promises and Promisors' Options, 6 IowA
L. BULL. 209 (1921); Note, Species of Inadequacy of Consideration Which Have In-
duced Judicial Refusal to Attach Obligation to Promise, 27 COLUm. L. Rev. 178
(1927); Note, supra note 10, at 1213; 102 U. PA. L. Rnv. 654, 655-57; 48 MICH. L.
R v. 362 (1948); 15 MINN. L. RFv. 469 (1931); 26 INn. L.J. 111 (1950).
Judicial skepticism about the enforceability of open-quantity contracts has had
surprising durability. See Sealtest S. Dairies Division v. Evans, 103 Ga. App. 835,
120 S.E.2d 887 (1961).
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healthy remnant of an age of skepticism. There were few courts which
specifically found an absence of good faith, and thus the limits of the
term were never tested.45 Nonetheless, much of the definitional lan-
guage of the opinions suggests that good faith would be found if a party
acted in accordance with recognized business standards.4 6 In addition,
a necessary, although often unarticulated, aspect of the good faith con-
cept was that it did not permit a quantity variation the sole purpose
of which was to avoid or take undue advantage of the contract.47
This construction, which required independent and dispassionate
business influences upon quantity levels, although not logically com-
pelled, did serve a most useful purpose. Its effect was to limit the risks
which the requirements seller and output buyer assumed to those of a
business nature.48  While even as redefined these risks covered a wide
45. For two pre-Code cases in which the quantity-determining party was said to
have acted in bad faith in demanding excessive quantities for speculative purposes,
see Asahel Wheeler Co. v. Mandelson, 180 App. Div. 9, 167 N.Y.S. 435 (Sup. CL
1917) and Moore v. American Molasses Co., 106 Misc. 263, 174 N.Y. Supp. 440
(Sup. CL 1919); cf. Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 F. 298
(6th Cir. 1903). Under the Code, at least one court has considered a case in which the
good faith standard of section 2-306 had not been met. See Massachusetts Gas & Elec.
Light Supply Corp. v. V-M Corp., 387 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1967).
In several pre-Code cases, courts specifically found the requisite good faith on the
part of the quantity-determining party. See, e.g., HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp.,
365 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1966); Oregon Plywood Sales Corp. v. Sutherlin Plywood
Corp., 246 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1957); Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Consolidated Gas Util.
Corp., 190 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1951); William C. Atwater & Co., Inc. v. Terminal
Coal Corp., 115 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1940); In re United Cigar Stores Co. of America,
72 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1934); Neofotistos v. Harvard Brewing Co., 341 Mass. 684,
171 N.E.2d 865 (1961); Dickey v. Philadelphia Minit-Man Corp., 377 Pa. 549, 105
A.2d 580 (1954); Berkeley County Public Serv. Dist. v. Vitro Corp. of Am. 152 W.
Va. 252, 162 S.E.2d 189 (1968).
46. See Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d
630, 633 (10th Cir. 1939); In re United Cigar Stores Co. of America, 72 F.2d 673, 675
(2d Cir. 1934); New York Cent. Ironworks Co. v. United States Radiator Co., 174
N.Y. 331, 335, 66 N.E. 967, 1968 (1903). See also text accompanying notes 71-72
infra.
47. See, e.g., Moore v. American Molasses Co., 106 Misc. 263 (1919), 174
N.Y.S. 440; Asahel Wheeler Co. v. Mandelson, 180 App. Div. 9, 167 N.Y.S. 435
(1917). Cf. Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 F. 298,
303 (6th Cir. 1903); Waddell v. Phillips, 133 Md. 497, 105 At. 771 (1919); Smith v.
Donk Bros. Coal & Coke, 260 S.W. 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924); Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co.
v. Peter Cooper's Glue Factory, 231 N.Y. 459, 132 N.E. 148 (1921).
48. The quantity term might seem to be extremely flexible even when only risks of
a business nature are assumed. However, the nature and extent of the quantity-
determining party's business will provide the boundaries within which the contract will
likely be performed. Particularly where the party is engaged in an established business,
he will usually not drastically increase or decrease the quantity under the contract
absent fortuitous circumstances. See, e.g., Excelsior Wrapper Co. v. Messinger, 116
Wis. 549, 555-56, 93 N.W. 459 (1903); 28 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 224-25.
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spectrum, they are more readily anticipated than the risk of personal
whim and, thus, can more easily be reflected in the price which the
promisee demands.
The good faith requirement continues under the Code and, in the
context of most open-quantity contracts, retains its risk-defining func-
tion. Under section 2-306, the level of requirements or output must
usually be established in accordance with reasonable commercial prac-
tices.49 Others have taken on the task of giving content to the good
faith criteria.50
OPEN-QUANTITY CONTRACTS UNDER SECTION 2-306
The Code provision on output and requirements contracts does
more than merely codify the good faith requirement. It also specifies
that even if this condition is satisfied, "no quantity unreasonably dis-
proportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated esti-
mate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or require-
ments may be tendered or demanded." The obfuscating structure of
this language masks its potential impact on the functions of open-
quantity contracts. It is this language which has prompted the inter-
pretation by some that, under the Code, reasonable proportionality is a
49. As generally applied throughout the Code, good faith means "honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned." UCC § 1-201(19). In transactions arising
under Article 2 which involve one who is a merchant, a more objective standard is
applicable. "'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." UCC
§ 2-103(1)(b). See, e.g., Stanley v. Fabricators, Inc., 459 P.2d 467, 474 (Alas.
1969); Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 269 A.2d 407, 408 (Del. Super. Ct.
1970); Columbus Milk Producers' Cooperative v. Department of Agriculture, 48 Wis.
2d 451, 180 N.W.2d 617 (1970); Mattek v. Malofsky, 42 Wis. 2d 16, 165 N.W.2d 406
(1969). The person typically involved in a requirements contract is a merchant since
the contract itself assumes an on-going operation. "Merchant" is defined in section 2-
104(1) as "a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods in-
volved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his
employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill." See, e.g., Associated Hardware Supply
Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1966); Makransky v. Long Is-
land Reo Track Co., 58 Misc. 2d 338, 295 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1968). But see Cook
Grains v. Fallis, 239 Ark. 962, 395 S.W.2d 555 (1965).
50. For a detailed treatment of the good faith concept, see generally DUESENDERO
& KING § 4.08[3] [a]; 1. NORDSTROm, supra note 6, § 40; Eisenberg, Good Faith
Under the Uniform Commercial Code-A New Look at an Old Problem, 54 MARQ.
L. REv. 1 (1971); Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonable-
ness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 666 (1963); and
Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. Rav. 195 (1968).
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limitation upon increases and decreases in requirements and output 5 1
This view works a fundamental and drastic change of the law of most
states.52  Moreover, if the quantity-determining party is bound to at
least the proximate level of his past consumption or production, his
ability to respond to changes in the profitability of his business is sig-
nificantly reduced. Under this yew of the Code, the quantity-de-
termining party's capacity to adjust his level of production remains only
within a limited range around the level of past quantities or contract
estimates. In effect, production flexibility as a commercial function
is made a considerably less attractive feature than it was in either the
pristine setting of the analysis given above or in the perspective of the
venerable Professor Corbin.
The desirability of this interpretation can be questioned. First,
because of the dependent relationship of the functions, the potential
advantages other than production flexibility will be severely restricted,
with the result that the commercial utility of this contractual form will
be eliminated in many situations. Relatedly, the interpretation lessens
the distinction between open- and fixed-quantity contracts. If a party
is bound to the approximate level of his past performance, then there is
only marginal value in not choosing the fixed-quantity form with its
likely price advantage." Since these two types of arrangements do not
have a common commercial purpose, the wisdom of legislating their
similarity is not apparent. Finally, while the objective of the pervasive
limitation found by some is undoubtedly to protect the one party from
a sudden and drastic change in the quantity level, it is not clear that
this protection is appropriately the subject of statutory prohibition.
This is the sort of risk which can often be counterbalanced by the price
paid by the quantity-determining party. Moreover, where the concern
is for decreases in quantity, the need for protection of the requirements
seller or output buyer is less compelling. As profit-maximization is in
the self-interest of the party who determines quantity, his inclination
will be to continue in operation whenever possible, a tendency which
tempers the risk of cessation. 4
51. See authorities cited in notes 7-9 supra.
52. See notes 68-71 infra and accompanying text.
53. For example, with such a limitation on the flexibility of open-quantity con-
tracts, the requirements buyer who is susceptible to a drastic reduction in his needs
may find it more advantageous to operate under a series of small fixed-quantity con-
tracts negotiated to fill short-term supply needs.
54. The early view that a promise to purchase requirements or output lacked mu-
tuality was premised on the notion that the quantity-determining party could easily
avoid the contract by simply arranging his affairs so as to have no requirements or
output. As is implicitly recognized in the subsequent judicial acceptance of the valid-
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In light of these objections, a question exists as to whether it is
likely that those who drafted the Code intended to obligate the quan-
tity-determining party to his prior level of performance. To be sure, in
situations where the risk of an undue burden on the requirements seller
or output buyer is acute, there may exist a need for a limitation beyond
that found in the good faith requirement. But it cannot be shown that
the need for such protection is equally compelling for all types of var-
ations. There is a basis in the text and Comment of section 2-306 for
reconciling the difficulties which the disputed interpretation raises,
while at the same time affirming the drafters' imposition of a quantity
limitation where compelled by policy. The premise of this view is
that while the drafters chose to treat all types of variations-increases
and decreases in both requirements and output-in one section, some
indicia of their intent and the dictates of policy suggest that the appli-
cation of the quantity-limitation is not uniform among these. Rather,
considerable support exists for the view that the limitation of the ex-
ception proviso of section 2-306 affects only unreasonably dispropor-
tionate increases in requirements or output. Decreases in quantity
would be limited only by the good faith standard. 56
While the analysis presented below will deal with all types of vari-
ity of open-quantity contracts, it is simply not realistic to premise a legal principle on
the assumption that decisions as to quantity will be made arbitrarily. Indeed, a more
appropriate basis for decision is a realization that, in general, the quantity-determining
party's incentive to continue his business represents a very practical limitation on the
likelihood that requirements or output will be reduced. The open-quantity contract
will typically be merely one aspect of a business which represents a commitment of
capital and energy of the party whose performance will define the quantities under
the contract. Having made an investment in his business, and, at least temporarily,
foregone other opportunities, the party will attempt to continue its operation, either to
achieve profitability or to enhance the return of an otherwise profitable business.
Those who deal with him can properly assume that he will not casually abandon the
endeavor or drastically modify its character. Thus, when the courts devised the rule
with respect to requirements contracts that "the seller assumes the risk of all good faith
variations in the buyer's requirements even to the extent of a determination to liquidate
or discontinue the business," it was recognized that the rule was "based on a reliance
on the self-interest of the buyer, who ordinarily will seek to have the largest possible
requirements." HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 1966).
See also 3 WiLLISTON § 464(a), at 741; 28 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 223, 224, n.8.
The quantity-determining party's pursuit of profitability may, of course, mean that
in particular situations he will pursue a course which does not benefit the other party.
For example, when the requirements buyer finds a less expensive substitute product,
he may seek to reduce or eliminate his orders from the requirements seller. It is this
type of case in which the requirement of good faith can be invoked to protect the
seller's expectation interest. See note 111 infra and accompanying text.
55. See WHIm & SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 108-09; 102 U. PA. L. REv.
654, 665-66 (1954). But see Romine, Inc. v. Savannah Steel Co., 117 Ga. App. 353,
160 S.E.2d 659 (1968).
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ations, it must be recognized that there are differences among these
four types with respect to both the extent of Comment language and
the amount of case precedent relevant to the particular type of fluctu-
ation. In the Comment, for example, only general references are made
to output variations, while requirements fluctuations, particularly de-
creases in requirements, are illustrated in specific examples. In addition,
requirements contracts appear to be the more frequently litigated
form.5 6
Because of the more extensive Comment language dealing with re-
quirements reductions, analysis of this form more readily reveals the
vulnerability of the view that the exception proviso of section 2-306
has equal application among the four types of variation. Further, the
more extensive pre-Code case treatment of this form permits more re-
liable analysis of the policy assumptions of judicial decision. Conse-
quently, analysis of the section as it affects decreases in requirements
will be undertaken first and in greatest detail.
Decreases in Requirements
The factual pattern. Considerations necessitating reduction in the
requirements buyer's demand include such factors as decreased product
demand,57 business interruptions,58 technical improvements in produc-
tion, 9 and availability of a less expensive substitute for the supplier's
material.60  But the difficulties with the Code language may be illus-
trated without discussion at this point of the variety of causes which
have prompted prior litigation. Rather, an appropriate vehicle for dis-
cussion of section 2-306(1) is found in the fact situation of Southwest
Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co.61 The cement
56. A very general and imprecise survey indicates that the majority of open-
quantity contracts are those in which quantity is determined by the requirements of
the buyer. Compare Annot., 1 A.L.R. 1392 (1919), Annot., 9 A.L.R. 276 (1920), and
Annot., 23 A.L.R. 574 (1923) with Annot., 7 A.L.R. 498 (1920), Annot., 27 A.L.R.
127 (1923), and Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1099 (1952). See also Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d
377 (1958).
57. See, e.g., Helena Light & Ry. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 57 Mont. 93, 186 P. 702
(1920), overruled on other grounds, City of Billings v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 67 Mont.
29, 39, 214 P. 608 (1923); Poston v. Western Dairy Products Co., 129 Wash. 73,
36 P.2d 65 (1934).
58. See, e.g., William C. Atwater & Co. v. Terminal Coal Corp., 115 F.2d 887
(1st Cir. 1940); Cragin Prods. Co. v. Fitch, 6 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1925).
59. See, e.g., Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102
F.2d 630 (10th Cir. 1939).
60. See, e.g., Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 F. 298
(6th Cir. 1903); McKeever, Cook & Co. v. Canonsburg Iron Co., 138 Pa. 184, 16 A.
97 (1890).
61. 102 F.2d 630 (10th Cir. 1939).
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company and Southwest's predecessor had entered into an agreement
in 1926 under which the gas company was to supply, for a 15-year pe-
riod, "all 'natural gas as may be needed or required by' the cement com-
pany 'for fuel, heating, lighting, power purposes and such other purposes
as may be necessary, proper or incidental to the operation of' its plant. '0 2
The cement company operation included gas-fired kilns, boilers, and
power facilities which, for the period immediately preceding the litiga-
tion, consumed approximately 5.3 million cubic feet of gas daily. By
subsequent agreement, the cement company was allowed to use up to
3 million cubic feet of gas per day from its own sources. In 1934, the
cement company sought to alter its boiler operation by replacing older,
independently fired boilers with a new system which utilized the waste
heat of cement processing kilns. While the older system required 2.3
million cubic feet of gas for its operation, the new installation would
reduce the consumption by as much as 1.9 million cubic feet. Because
of the agreement which allowed the cement company to use its own
gas supply, the effect of the new operation was to reduce the maximum
quantity supplied by the gas company from 2.3 million cubic feet to .4
million cubic feet per day. In its suit to enjoin the use of the new
boiler system, the gas company contended that the agreement between
the parties prevented a change in the method of the buyer's operation
which would drastically reduce its "requirements" of natural gas.
While the statement of arguments in the opinion is somewhat incom-
plete, Southwest's position can be assumed to have been that the cement
company was required, for the remainder of the contract term, to main-
tain its consumption at the previous level of 5.3 million cubic feet per
day.
The court concluded that the reduction was the result of a good
faith alteration in operation and thus permissible under applicable prec-
edents.63 In the court's reading of prior cases, an agreement to pur-
chase one's requirements of a particular commodity did not prevent
the purchaser "from exercising judgment and discretion in the conduct
of his business or from improving his plant . ,,. Noting the un-
usual duration of the parties' agreement, the court found an implied as-
sumption at the time of contracting that existing equipment would re-
quire replacement during the contract time and that a modem, more
efficient system would be a likely replacement.
62. Id. at 631.
63. The court found In re United Cigar Stores Co. of America, 72 F.2d 673 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 617 (1934), and American & British Mfg. Corp. v. New
Idria Quicksilver Mining Co., 293 F. 509 (1st Cir. 1923) particularly persuasive in
this regard.
64. 102 F.2d at 633.
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The significance of the section 2-306 ambiguities appears most
sharply when the two likely interpretations of that provision are ap-
plied to the Southwest Natural Gas case. To forestall diversionary as-
saults upon this application, however, it is necessary that two factors be
posited. First, it must be assumed that had the case been decided
under the Code, the court's perception of the content of the good faith
requirement would have been the same and that a contemporary court
could join Judge Phillip's confident conclusion that "[in so improving
its plant, the Cement Company acted in good faith and in the exercise
of prudent business judgement."65  Secondly, it must be assumed that
the reduction of the buyer's consumption of seller's natural gas from
2.3 to .4 million cubic feet per day resulted in a level of use "unrea-
sonably disproportionate" to "normal or otherwise comparable" re-
quirements.66
It is clear that if section 2-306 is interpreted as establishing a two-
prong test in this situation-requiring both good faith and a reduction
which is not unreasonably disproportionate-the result in Southwest
Natural Gas will be reversed. Having failed to satisfy the second facet
of the test, the cement company's plant alteration could not have been
without legal liability. But such a radical change in the law does not
have a readily identifiable policy base. Rather a continuation of the
singular good faith standard of pre-Code law is preferable and, some
inconsistencies aside, the drafters' product seems to support this result.
Indeed, there are obvious difficulties with the argument that Southwest
Natural Gas does not continue as valid precedent, for the Comment
cites that case approvingly: "Reasonable variation of an extreme sort
is exemplified in Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland
Cement Co. .... "617
65. Id.
66. The fact that the term "unreasonably disproportionate" is not defined is an
obvious invitation to a court to structure its decision to reach a fair result without re-
sort to a mechanical standard. Among the facts likely to be considered in judging
whether the reduction in buyer's consumption is "unreasonably disproportionate" are
(1) the percentage of the reduction, (2) the effect on profitability, (3) the nature of
the buyer's business, and (4) the degree to which the parties originally contemplated
that the buyer's needs would fluctuate. See also WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 13,
§ 3-8, at 106.
67. UCC § 2-306, Comment 2.
One point of vulnerability in this analysis of the case is the second assumption set
forth above to the effect that the amount of the new gas orders would be found to be
"unreasonably disproportionate" to the level of pre-conversion orders. It might be
suggested that, since the Comment identifies this as a case of "reasonable variation,"
it is improper to assume, as was done above, that this was an impermissible variation.
A more reasonable construction is that the Comment deemed the variation "reason-
able" in a qualitative, and not a quantitative sense. That is, the variation was the
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Prior law. The decision in Southwest Natural Gas is representa-
tive of the trend of decisions prior to the Code. Earlier decisions were
divided on the question of the consequence of a drastic reduction in a
buyer's requirements and a few later cases have continued to adhere to
the view that significant reductions are not permissible. 8 But the clear
trend of more recent, pre-Code cases was to sanction reduction even
to cessation.69 More persuasive than the sheer number of these cases,
however, is their rationale. While the risks accompanying the open-
quantity contract were specifically recognized,70 the decisions reflect
the concern that the contract not be interpreted so as to limit the buy-
er's right to pursue the dictates of his business judgment. Although the
buyer is bound to buy any requirements he might have from the seller,
"he is left free to deal with his business as he may deem best, provided
his conduct is bona fide.'71
result of the reasonable actions of the cement company in changing its heating system.
Several reasons suggest this result. First, other language of the sentence identifies the
variation as one "of an extreme sort." This is the more likely reference to the quan-
titative degree of change, which was, in fact, extreme. Second, under the two-prong
test, that which cannot be "unreasonably disproportionate" is not the present level of
the buyer's requirements, but rather the present level of his orders. In Southwest
Natural Gas, the buyer had, before the equipment change, ordered 2.3 million cubic
feet of natural gas; after the change, he ordered .4 million cubic feet. Surely a reduc-
tion of orders to 17 percent of prior orders is an unreasonably disproportionate change.
68. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. R.P. Brown, 218 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1955);
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Cox, 207 Va. 197, 148 S.E.2d 756 (1966). In Cox,
the court recognized that it followed the minority rule in holding that a require-
ments contract includes an implied promise by the buyer to continue to have require-
ments during the term of the contract. 207 Va. at 204, 148 S.E.2d at 762.
69. See, e.g., HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1966);
Oregon Plywood Sales Corp. v. Sutherlin Plywood Corp., 246 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.
1957); Ft. Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 130 F.2d
471 (3d Cir. 1942); William C. Atwater & Co. v. Terminal Coal Corp., 115 F.2d
887 (1st Cir. 1940); In re United Cigar Stores Co. of America, 72 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.
1934); DuBoff v. Matam Corp., 272 App. Div. 502, 71 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1947); Berkeley
County Public Serv. Dist. v. Vitro Corp. of America, 152 W. Va. 252, 162 S.E.2d
189 (1968).
70. See, e.g., HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.
1966); In re United Cigar Stores Co. of America, 72 F.2d 673, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1934).
71. In re United Cigar Stores Co. of America, 72 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1934).
A similar attitude is found in William C. Atwater & Co. v. Terminal Coal Corp., 115
F.2d 887, 888 (Ist Cir. 1940); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland
Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630 (10th Cir. 1939); and DuBoff v. Matam Corp., 272 App.
Div. 502, 71 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1947). The good faith standard has often been ex-
pressed in terms of its relationship to the buyer's business judgment. See, e.g., Berke-
ley County Public Serv. Dist. v. Vitro Corp. of America, 152 W. Va. 252, 271, 162
S.E.2d 189, 202 (1968) (requirements buyer may alter its operation to eliminate
requirements if done "in good faith for valid business reasons"). See also Royal Paper
Box Co. v. E.R. Apt Shoe Co., 290 Mass. 207, 210, 195 N.E. 96, 98 (1935).
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This emphasis on the legitimacy of good faith business judgment
underscores the primary commercial function of open-term contracts.
The buyer accepts a requirements contract because it insures produc-
tion flexibility. That objective encompasses the possibility that in pe-
riods of decreasing profits, requirements will be reduced.71 The re-
quirements arrangement is regarded as one tool which can be utilized
to assist the profitability of a buyer's business; it has a flexibility which
insures that supply levels will be directly responsive to business judg-
ments about supply needs. If the buyer were bound to prior perfor-
mance level, his requirements contract would hardly be a useful tool
in profit maximization. Indeed, it would be a major impediment to
that objective in periods of business contraction: the buyer would be
bound to accept goods which he neither needed nor could profitably
use.
In short, the prior cases recognized what surely must be a uni-
versal truth: a party is not likely to bargain away his right to run his
business according to his best judgment. Indeed, it is likely that any
significant limitation upon business judgment as it relates to profit
maximization will receive attention in the terms of the contract of the
parties. Seemingly these propositions are sufficiently basic that they
should be reflected in the language of the Code.
The Code language. The primary support for good faith as the
singular standard against which reduced requirements are to be judged
is found in the Comment to section 2-306. There is, however, reason
to pause with the language of the text itself. The word forms used are,
to say the least, curious, and they reflect, at best, a drafting intent
which is suggestive in its ambiguity. Particularly relevant are the
verbs used in the exception proviso. That provision sets down
the rule that no unreasonably disproportionate quantity may be "tend-
ered or demanded." Where a drastic reduction in the buyer's re-
quirements occurs, there is no unreasonably disproportionate tender,
for that term describes only a seller's act, a performance not in ques-
tion in the instant situation. 73 But is a disproportionate quantity being
72. See Ft. Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 130
F.2d 471 (34 Cir. 1942); William C. Atwater & Co. v. Terminal Coal Corp.,
115 F.2d 887, 888 (1st Cir. 1940) (sale of requirements buyer's business "made in
absolute good faith and for the purpose of preventing further financial losses . . . in
a losing business").
73. A construction which would make the exception proviso applicable to the
seller's tender in the situation where the requirements of the buyer have declined is
suggested in 102 U. PA. L. Rnv. 654, 664. The argument is that, by applying the
word "tender" to a requirements seller in a case where the buyer's good faith require-
ments decline an unreasonably disproportionate amount, the seller may force the
Vol. 1973:599]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
"demanded"? Arguably not, if that term is given its connotative
meaning as suggesting a bold or forceful assertion. It has been con-
tended, therefore, that the term "demanded" has no applicability to
the buyer's conduct in the situation where he is attempting to reduce
his level of consumption and avoid the seller's efforts to proffer quan-
tities he does not need.74  The term does, however, accurately describe
the quality of the buyer's order where his requirements have signifi-
cantly increased and he looks to the seller to increase his supply ac-
cordingly. The buyer's approach in such a case is one of exacting a
performance which the seller, because of limited production capacity
or whatever, may be either unable or unwilling to undertake. An ex-
panded level of performance is "demanded. '7 5
In the final analysis, not many will be persuaded to support the
buyer to take up to a reasonable variation. 'This would seem to be the interpretation
intended by Comment 3 which states that 'an agreed estimate is to be regarded as a
center around which the parties intend the variation to occur."' Id. The author
points out, however, that such a construction appears to be inconsistent with the asser-
tion in Comment 2 that good faith discontinuance is possible. Id.
74. See id. at 664. Cf. DuEsENBERG & KING § 4.05[2].
75. Popular dictionary analysis attributes a special meaning to the term when it is
used in a legal context. In its noun form, it may mean a requisition or a legal claim.
THE RANDOM HOUSE DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 383 (unabridged ed.
1967). See WEBsTER's THIum NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 598 (1961). Thus, the Code
language may describe only the buyer's act of exercising what he views as his con-
tractual right to order only such goods as he requires. The difficulty with this view
is that it strains even the accepted legal variation of "demand" and gives a meaning
to section 2-306 which is not apparent upon the face of that provision. "Demand," as
used in the law, often describes the specialized act of making a formal request in order
to satisfy the precondition of more substantive rights and remedies. Thus, a "de-
mand" for payment must precede suit on an instrument. In a more general sense, the
term may imply that one's request carries the force of law and that compliance is the
only acceptable response. Neither of these legal usages properly describes the buyer's
act in attempting to deviate from prior performance levels. In this posture, the buyer
must assume a less affirmative stance.
It might also be argued that the term "disproportionate" can apply to either an
increase or decrease in the buyer's requirements, since the term speaks only to the
question of relative size and, thus, may include a variation either upward or downward.
Had the exception been intended to apply only where requirements increased, the ar-
gument would proceed, that limitation would have been expressed in a more precise
phrase and the section might have read: "no quantity disproportionately in excess of
. .." or "no quantity unreasonably in excess of prior requirements may be demanded."
By way of rebuttal, it must be noted that with regard to requirements contracts, the
crucial term is "demanded." While the phrase "disproportionate" admits of either up-
ward or downward fluctuation, only a greater quantity would be "demanded" in the
sense seemingly intended in section 2-306(1). Thus, the quantity description-"un-
reasonably disproportionate"-gains its substance from the word chosen to describe
the requirements buyer's act and the drafters cannot be said to have used phrasing
which indicates an intention to include disproportionately smaller orders within the
statutory exception.
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singular good faith standard solely on the basis of the above construc-
tion of the word "demanded. 7 6  The argument is not, however, with-
out some attraction. But standing alone, it partakes of too great a
subtlety; it is not the sort of distinction upon which great legal princi-
ples are laid, whether intended or not. Many will feel that had the
drafters intended such subtlety, either the text of the Code would have
been made more clear or the Comment would have included an ex-
plicit explanation.77 But it does not require much close work with the
Code to realize that caution and crystal clarity were not uniformly
applied as drafting guidelines in preparation of the model statute. Few
Code arguments will be won on the basis of what was not stated or
made clear. The great virtue of the Code-that it received the atten-
tion of a great many minds-has also to some extent frustrated its goal
of uniformity, at least in the sense uniformity of construction is aided
by uniformity in draftmanship.
While it can be conceded that the Comment does not make explicit
the intended meaning of the verb "demanded" as used in the exception
proviso, the Comment and its history do suggest application of the
singular good faith test in the reduced requirements context and, thus,
inferentially lend some support to the limiting definition of the term
suggested above. This is shown below. The extent to which the
suggested construction is relied on for support can be briefly stated.
In sum, it is felt that .the drafters' choice of a word which carries
value-connotations applicable only where the requirements buyer's de-
mands increase does little more than create an ambiguity. It is not
contended that the word choice should carry the argument for the
singular good faith standard. Rather, the term provides the invitation
for one to search into the Comment language as well as to formulate
76. Perhaps the connotative sense of "demand" was not intended. The term
"demand" has a meaning in economic analysis which suggests only a desire to pur-
chase. This usage conveys no value-assuming connotation with respect to the vigor of
the requests of the consumer. Thus, a requirements buyer would be said to have de-
mands, whatever his new level of consumption relative to prior needs. It is doubtful,
however, that the term "demanded" in section 2-306 has reference to the phrase of
the economist, since in a statute of general application, it is unlikely that the drafters
would borrow a term from a discipline not generally within the competence of those
who would deal with the enactment.
77. But a contrary argument could also be suggested: other more neutral terms
such as "ordered" or "requested" were available; since these were not chosen, a nega-
tive inference is therefore warranted. It might further be suggested that despite the
limited validity of drawing inferences from the drafters' failure to choose alternative
phrasing, that analysis may have more respectability with relation to the Code than in
other statutory treatments, if only because of the extensive scrutiny given the Code by
its formulators, supporters, and critics. These arguments suffer the same deficiency as
that mentioned in the text.
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a construction of the Code text from the principles which seemed to
be operative in pre-Code cases.
The drafters' commentary. The view that decreases in require-
ments are limited by a standard other than good faith gains some support
from the drafters' Comment. Comment 3 provides:
If an estimate of output or requirements is included in the agreement, no
quantity unreasonably disproportionate to it may be tendered or de-
manded. Any minimum or maximum set by the agreement shows a
clear limit on the intended elasticity. In similar fashion, the agreed
estimate is to be regarded as a center around which the parties intend
the variation to occur.
The paragraph is, of course, directed to the situation in which the par-
ties have included a specific performance estimate in their agreement.
Yet, the paragraph apparently was also intended to enlighten Code
readers where there is only a prior requirements level and no contract
estimate, for the language of the Code equates the two criteria: "ex-
cept that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to an estimate or
in the absence of a stated estimate, to any normal prior . . . require-
ments . . . ." Thus, whatever is said about variations from estimates
would arguably apply to variations from prior performance levels as
well. While an argument might be made that estimates should have a
greater controlling effect on the parties' performance under the con-
tract, this proposition has been considered, and generally rejected, in
pre-Code decisions.78
78. There may be strong policy reasons for giving great weight to the fact that
the parties bargained about an expected level of performance. The presence of the
estimate may mean that their reasonable expectations are more definite than in the
situation where only a prior performance level is involved. See, e.g., Merriam v.
United States, 107 U.S. 437 (1883); Knowles Foundry & Machine Co. v. National
Plate Glass Co., 274 111 App. 570, 577-80 (1934); C.A. Andrews Coal Co. v. Board
of Directors, 151 La. 695, 92 So. 303 (1922); DuESENBERG & KING § 4.05[2], at
4-56. On the other hand, the fact that the quantity figure is merely an estimate-
and not a firm amount-is strong evidence that the parties were unable or unwilling to
define precisely the extent of the commitment. Courts have been quite receptive to
the view that the indefiniteness of the estimate suggests that the parties did not in-
tend to be bound by it. The leading case in this regard is Brawley v. United States,
96 U.S. 168 (1877); the most recent, Romine, Inc. v. Savannah Steel Co., 117 Ga.
App. 353, 354, 160 S.E.2d 659, 660-61 (1968). See also Shader Contractors, Inc. v.
United States, 276 F.2d 15 (Ct. Cl. 1960); M.W. Kellogg Co. v. Standard Steel
Fabricating Co., 189 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1951); Marx v. American Malting Co.,
169 F. 582, 584 (6th Cir. 1909); Wolff v. Wells Fargo & Co., 115 F. 32, 36 (9th Cir.
1902); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Beales, 56 Cal. App. 212, 215-16, 205 P. 18, 20
(1922); Bautovitch v. G.S. Lumber Co., 129 La. 857, 859-60, 56 So. 1026, 1027
(1911); Stanfield v. Arnwine, 102 Ore. 289, 296-97, 202 P. 559, 562-63 (1921);
Kenan, McKay & Spier v. Yorkville Cotton Oil Co., 109 S.C. 462, 468-69, 96 S.E.
524, 525-26 (1918); Arcola Sugar Mills Co. v. Farmer Hamlett's Co., 220 S.W. 385,
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The critical Comment language is the last sentence which establishes
an estimate of requirements-and, therefore, a prior consumption level
-as "a center around which the parties intend the variation to occur."
Since the standard is a "center" point and since variations are to occur
"around" it, the variation may be either an increase or decrease. In
identifying the standard as a median point-rather than a limitation
upon upward variations only-the Comment may evidence the drafters'
intent to encompass both types of variations within the statutory excep-
tion.70 If the deviation is a radical increase in demand, the seller in-
curs no liability for continuing to supply at prior levels. Conversely,
and most responsive to our case, a significant downward deviation from
the median deprives the seller of a portion of his bargain and may obli-
gate the buyer either to continue performance according to prior
standards, ° or more likely, to pay money damages.81
But a more specific reference to the question of the effect of a dras-
tic reduction in the requirements buyer's demand is found in Comment
2. The Comment specifically endorses application of an unconditional
good faith standard in this situation. The relevant language is intro-
duced by the general rule that:
The party who will determine quantity is required to operate his plant
. . . in good faith and according to commercial standards of fair dealing
in the trade so that his output or requirements will approximate a rea-
sonably feasible figure.
This is followed by the qualification that "reasonable elasticity is ex-
pressly envisaged" by section 2-306. To this point, the language pre-
sents no particular insight into the problem of a drastic reduction in
387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Brown-Lloyd Co., 167 S.W. 162, 164
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Loeb v. Winsboro Cotton Oil Co., 93 S.W. 515, 515-16
(Tex. Civ. App. 1906); Mathieson Alkali Works v. Virginia Banner Coal Corp., 147
Va. 125, 137-40, 136 S.E. 673, 677 (1927); Excelsior Wrapper Co. v. Messinger, 116
Wis. 549, 93 N.W. 459 (1903). See generally 28 COLum. L. RFV. 223, 228-30.
The Code language does not endorse any distinction between estimates and prior
requirements. Ascribing due priority to the statutory language compels the equation of
the two standards despite the invitation to limit Comment 3 to cases involving estimates.
It is clear, however, that the parties may, by agreement, establish an estimate which lim-
its the freedom of the quantity-determining party to vary from it. Harry Thuresson,
Inc. v. United States, 453 F.2d 1278, 1280-82 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
79. Some of the secondary material supporting the two-prong approach suggests
this view. See, e.g., DuESENBERG & KING § 4.05[2]; R. NORDSTROM, supra note 6, § 40.
80. Brief mention is made of equitable remedies, including specific performance,
in the context of requirements contracts in Note, supra note 10, at 1229. See
also Mantell v. International Plastic Harmonica Corp., 141 NJ. Eq. 379, 390-94,
55 A.2d 250, 257-59 (CL Err. & App. 1947); Central Power & Light Co. v.
Purvis, 67 S.W.2d 1086, 1095 (Tex- Civ. App. 1934).
81. See generally 5 A. ConnN, ComNTcrs §§ 990-1075 (1964).
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requirements undertaken in good faith. But the next clause of the
Comment seems directly responsive to this situation: "good faith
variations from prior requirements are permitted even when the variation
may be such as to result in discontinuance" (emphasis added).
To illustrate the intended impact of this language, the Comment sug-
gests that "a shutdown by a requirements buyer for lack of orders may
be permissible . . . ." This discussion of the impact of the Code is
concluded with a citation to Southwest Natural Gas.82 The drafters
view the variation there as one "of an extreme sort," but nonetheless
deem it a "reasonable variation," suggesting Code approval of the re-
sult.
The explicit endorsement of reductions in requirements is quali-
fied only by the reference to good faith. No limitation on the relative
size of the decrease is suggested and the possible application of any
such standard is negated by the specific mention of reductions which
result in discontinuance. Nor does it appear that a special exception
was intended for discontinuances which would not apply to any drastic
reduction which fell short of complete cessation of demand. Rather,
the Comment language suggests that good faith sanctions a continuum
of variations between prior requirements and discontinuance."8
By contrast, the discussion in Comment 2 with respect to increases
in requirements implies that elements other than good faith limit de-
mands by the requirements buyer for increased supplies. The Com-
ment flatly states that ". . . a sudden expansion of the plant by which
requirements are to be measured would not be included within the scope
of . . . this section . . . ."4 Although "sudden expansion" could
82. See text accompanying notes 61-67 supra.
83. See Note, supra note 10, at 1220. Pre-Code cases have rejected the notion
that a distinction should be made between a mere reduction in quantities and a dis-
continuance of operations. For example, in Helena Light & Ry. v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
57 Mont. 93, 186 P. 702 (1920), the buyer agreed to purchase such electric power
as he required at specified locations. When the buyer abandoned those facilities, the
seller argued that the contract should be read to require that some power be consumed.
The court dismissed as fallacious the argument that "abandonment of the [facility]
constituted a breach of the contract, but the maintenance of a 1-watt electric light
there would not." Id. at 105, 186 P. at 705.
84. This clause is then qualified by the statement that "normal expansion under-
taken in good faith would be within the scope of this section." UCC § 2-306,
Comment 2 (May, 1949 draft). The intended contrast is presumably between "nor-
mal" and "sudden" expansion, but the significance of this contrast is not apparent.
The meaning of the phrase "normal" must be interpreted in light of the Code criteria,
and, thus, any such expansion must not produce disproportionate demand. See text
accompanying notes 97-113 infra. This analysis, although logically compelled, ren-
ders the clause conclusory and of limited significance as an interpretive guide,
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presumably occur in good faith, the Comment nonetheless construes sec-
tion 2-306 as a limitation in this situation, which finds justification in the
phrasing employed in the exception proviso.
The history of the Comment. Even if it can be assumed that
Comment 2 unequivocally endorses the good faith standard as the sole
limitation upon drastic decreases in requirements, there is an apparent
conflict with the principle implied in Comment 3. The latter para-
graph states that any estimate, and by implication a prior performance
level, serves to peg the quantity term; any variation from that level,
either upwards or downwards, must not be quantitatively significant.
The history of the Comment offers some insight into the intended sig-
nificance of the two paragraphs. The present form of Comment 3 is
unchanged from the first publication of the integrated Code in 1949.5
Comment 2, on the other hand, was substantially revised subsequent to
the 1949 draft. In its original form, it included only one sentence
dealing with variations in output or requirements. It read: "Discon-
tinuance or sudden expansion of either output or requirements must be
in good faith in order to avoid liability under the contract."8 6 This was
followed by an unqualified citation to Southwest Natural Gas. In the
1950 draft,8 7 the paragraph was expanded to include substantially the
same elaboration which is found in the present version of the Code:
Reasonable elasticity in the requirements is expressly envisaged by this
section and good faith variations from prior requirements are permitted
even when the variation may be such as to result in discontinuance. A
shutdown by a requirements buyer for lack of orders might be permis-
sible when a shutdown merely to curtail losses would not. The essential
test is whether the party is acting in good faith. Similarly, a sudden ex-
pansion of the plant by which requirements are to be measured would
not be included within the scope of the contract as made but normal
expansion undertaken in good faith would be within the scope of this
section. One of the factors in an expansion situation would be whether
the market price had risen greatly in a case in which the requirements
contract contained a fixed price. Reasonable variation of an extreme
sort is exemplified in Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland
Cement Co. ...
It should be emphasized that it was in the process of this revision
that the Comment was amended to state that "good faith variations
from prior requirements are permitted even when the variation may be
85. UCC § 2-306, Comment 3 (May, 1949 draft).
86. Id. at Comment 2.
87. UCC § 2-306, Comment 2 (Spring, 1950 draft).
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such as to result in discontinuance" and to identify Southwest Natural
Gas as a case exemplifying an extreme variation which was nonetheless
sanctioned under section 2-306. The 1950 revision represents an at-
tempt to deal specifically with the application of the section in the con-
text of decreasing requirements. It was apparently felt that the original
version did not provide a sufficient answer for the question of the ap-
plication of the section in this situation. Because the revision was in-
tended as a clarification, it may be regarded as more directly responsive
to the anticipated questions in this regard than the interpretation found
in Comment 3. While the contrary implication of the third paragraph
was not specifically dispelled, the revisor may well have seen no need
for modification of that paragraph in light of the explicit statement in
the revised Comment 2 that substantial reduction even to the point of
discontinuance is sanctioned by the section if undertaken in good faith.
The least that can be said is that Comments 2 and 3 are not on equal
footing as far as offering guidance for the Code's applicability to the
particular problem of diminished requirements. The former repre-
sents the drafters' efforts to confront the situation directly while the lat-
ter has application only by inference. In this posture, there should be
little question as to the drafters' intent.
There may be some question whether modification of the language
used in the Comment provides a reliable basis for discerning the in-
tended impact of the section. Indeed, the Code text at one time
seemed to suggest that such analysis was not only not to be favored,
but also to be avoided entirely. Section 1-102(3)(g) of the 1952 edi-
tion of the Code provided that "[p~rior drafts of text and comments
may not be used to ascertain legislative intent."88  The Comment to
that section suggested the reason for the provision: "Frequently mat-
ters have been omitted as being implicit without statement and language
has been changed or added solely for clarity. The only safe guide to
intent lies in the final text and comments."89 This provision was de-
leted from subsequent drafts with an accompanying explanation which
is not totally satisfactory."°
88. UCC § 1-102(3)(g) (1952 draft).
89. Id. at Comment 2.
90. 1956 REc MENDATioNS OF TnE EDrrORIAL BoARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMER.
CIAL CODE 3 explains that "paragraph (3) (g) was deleted because the changes from the
text enacted in Pennsylvania in 1953 are clearly legitimate legislative history."
This explanation raises a number of questions: Does it suggest that changes
made prior to the 1952 edition adopted in Pennsylvania are not legitimate legislative
history? Indeed, should changes made by a group unconnected with the legislature
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Quite apart from this vacillation by the drafters, there should be
little question that modifications in the text and comments can support
guarded inferences about the intended effect of Code language. The
Comment to the now-abandoned section 1-102(3)(g) suggests such
a result, despite its efforts to the contrary. Text and Comments have
occasionally been modified "for clarity." When such a clarifying
amendment can reasonably be identified as such, one may infer that
the clarification controls over other language which inferentially sug-
gests the contrary or at least leaves the meaning in doubt. This, of
course, is the approach used above in construing section 2-306(1):
Comment 3 appeared in the original; the crucial language of Comment
2 was subsequently added; even if added "solely for clarity," it tells us
something both about what was previously unclear and about what
meaning the addition was intended to convey.
The admonition against use of prior drafts was properly deleted
as simply being too rigid. The explanation accompanying the dele-
tion, while otherwise unsatisfactory, recognizes this. 91 An accepted
mode of construction is discarded if comparison of prior drafts is ab-
solutely prohibited. No sound reason suggests that such a prohibition
should be universally applied. A more palatable rule is, of course, the
one usually followed in analogous situations: inferences must not
be drawn lightly from deletions from or additions to prior drafts; such
modifications may have been motivated by factors other than those
which first appear.92 In the present situation, this suggests that sole
reliance should not be placed on the addition of clarifying language to
the Comment accompanying section 2-306. This directive presents no
great difficulty. The interpretation suggested here gains support from
other sources: the specific language used in the clarification, a plausi-
ble interpretation of the language of the Code text,93 and an analysis of
the implications of policy identified in prior law.
be considered legislative history? See A. FARNswoTH & J. HONNOLD, supra note 17,
at 8.
91. 1956 RECOMMENDATONS OF THE EDrrosA.L BOARD FOR THE UNiFoma Com-
MERCIAI CODE 3. The explanation recognized that when Pennsylvania modified some
sections in adopting the Code, it seemed reasonable to allow the inference of "intent" to
be drawn from that fact.
92. Cf. United States v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry., 247 U.S. 310
(1918); United States v. Limehouse, 58 F.2d 395 (E.D.S.C. 1931), rev'd on other
grounds, 285 U.S. 424 (1932); Bowles v. Goebel, 58 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.D.), affd,
151 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1945); D.N. Kelley & Son, Inc. v. Selectmen, 294 Mass. 570,
3 N.E.2d 241 (1936); State ex rel. Taylor v. Hall, 129 Neb. 669, 262 N.W. 835
(1935). See generally 82 C.IS. Statutes § 355 (1953).
93. See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra.
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Decreases in Output
Neither the Code text nor the Comment provides a means for sep-
arately analyzing the treatment of decreases in the output seller's
product. When output contracts are mentioned, it is in conjunction
with requirements contracts. In absence of more particularized expres-
sions of intent, it should be clear that the drafters equated the two types
of agreements. Thus, what has been said about the intended impact
of section 2-306 upon decreases in requirements should have applica-
tion to decreases in output, even though the support to be drawn from
the text and Comments is not as detailed. 94 On this basis, decreases in
output would be judged against the singular good faith test.
Courts and commentators have accepted the equation of require-
ments and output contracts. An interchange of precedent between
these two forms has occurred even though the priority of functions in
typical transactions of each is likely to differ.95 The decisions permit-
ting good faith decreases in requirements are mirrored in opinions treat-
ing output reductions, although the lesser number of cases dealing with
output contracts and the occasional decision to the contrary preclude cer-
94. The Comment to section 2-306 includes several statements which indicate that
the drafters assumed that the enforcement and interpretation of output and require-
ments would be governed by the same principles. For example, it is stated that "a
contract for output or requirements is not too indefinite .... " Comment 2. Simi-
larly, "[i]f an estimate of output or requirements is included in the agreement, no
quantity unreasonably disproportionate to it may be tendered or demanded." Com-
ment 3.
There is one language usage in the text of the section which is susceptible to an
interpretation which would provide greater restriction for output fluctuations. The
Code uses the terms tendered and demanded, the former presumably referring to
output contracts and the latter to requirements contracts. It has been suggested
above that the term demanded may refer only to demands for increases in require-
ments. See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra. This view is premised on the
notion that the term carries a connotation indicating the requirements buyer's desire
for increased quantities. It will be noted that the term tendered is more clearly
neutral in this regard and does not admit of a suggestion of whether the output seller's
tender is more or less than his previous tenders. This might suggest that both in-
creases and decreases in output are controlled, while only increases in requirements are
limited by estimates or prior output. However, further analysis should suggest that
such a reading was not intended. The general equation of the principles governing
output and requirements contracts in the Comment, as well as a consideration of rele-
vant policy, support this view. See text accompanying notes 97-113 infra.
95. The requirements buyer typically places greatest emphasis upon the fact that
an open-quantity contract affords him an opportunity to adjust his consumption to
the demands of his business. The output seller, on the other hand, will typically be
attracted to an output arrangement primarily because of the cost-savings which result
from a guaranteed market. In each type of contract, however, other motives may well
be present. See text accompanying notes 18-35 supra.
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tainty in this judgment. An important aspect of the transfer of prec-
edent is the recognition that the output seller, like the requirements
buyer, is not likely to subordinate his business judgment to the poten-
tial advantages of his output contract, at least not in the absence of
contract provisions which make that choice clear. Thus, courts de-
ciding cases involving decreased output refer to decisions involving re-
quirements contracts for the proposition that the output seller retains,
within the bounds of good faith, control of the business decisions
which affect his level of production.9  In short, it is suggested that
the same analytical considerations which support the contention that
section 2-306 requires application of only the "good-faith" standard to
cases involving reduced requirements apply with parallel force and
effect to instances of decreased output.
Increases in Requirements and Output
It is apparent that the Code was intended to limit some types of
quantity variation by a standard other than the good faith criteria.
As there is a basis for substantial doubt that the coverage either should
or was intended to be extended to decreases in requirements or output,
it may be reasonable to posit that increases in either could not be "un-
reasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of
a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or
requirement . . . ,97 Such a result would limit the utility of open-
quantity contracts, for the ability to respond to changes in profitability
would not extend to opportunities for substantially larger profits.
Nonetheless, imposition of a limitation on increases in requirements
and output can be defended as eliminating a potentially ruinous ad-
vantage in the quantity-determining party, while at the same time pre-
serving his control over the essential business judgments of his opera-
tion.
Prior law. An early case which had a significant role in shaping
the judicial attitude toward disproportionate increases in quantity was
Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sonheimer & Co.98 The buyer had agreed
96. See, e.g., Neofotistos v. Harvard Brewing Co., 341 Mass. 684, 688, 171 N.E.2d
865, 868 (1961). The court held that in the output contract under consideration,
"[i]t was necessarily contemplated by the parties that, whatever the [level of] produc-
tion, it would be governed by business conditions." Id. Support for this conclusion
was found in Royal Paper Box Co. v. E.R. Apt Shoe Co., 290 Mass. 207, 195 N.E. 96
(1935). See also Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Consolidated Gas Util. Corp., 190 F.2d 985,
990 (10th Cir. 1951).
97. UCC § 2-306.
98. 239 F. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
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to purchase the entire cinder output of the seller's plant. The cinders
were a by-product of sulphur refining, the seller's main business. The
advent of World War I during the term of the contract significantly
increased the demand for sulphur. In responding to this new demand,
the seller produced cinders at a rate which exceeded prior levels of pro-
duction by two-thirds. The federal district court held that the buyer
was bound to accept the increased output. In his opinion, an un-
sympathetic Learned Hand suggested a rationale which was resounding
in its dispassion:
I agree that the production occasioned by the Great War was a surprise
to both sides, and that it was not within their forecast of the future. It
is altogether likely that the defendant would have cried off upon the
whole bargain, had they thought it probable. Contracts cannot, how-
ever, be treated so loosely: if the parties wish more certainty, they must
use more certain words. 99
This general approach has been followed in other cases, although often
upon facts which suggest that the approval of increased quantities is
more likely the result of a judicial decision to bind the parties to a fore-
seeable event than of wholehearted endorsement of the Eustis ration-
ale.100
Despite these precedents, there are indications of judicial concern
for the potentially harsh consequences of sanctioning unlimited in-
creases in the consumption of the requirements buyer or the produc-
tion of the output seller. Evidence of this concern can, for example,
be seen in the treatment of jobbers who held requirements contracts.
Even after courts had dispelled most of their doubts about the mu-
tuality of open-quantity contracts, a distinction was made between con-
tracts entered into by requirements buyers who had an established
manufacturing operation and those who were mere jobbers or deal-
ers. 101  The reluctance to find mutuality, although now apparently
quieted by the Code,10 2 lingered much longer with respect to the latter.
99. Id. at 986.
100. See, e.g., Marx v. American Malting Co., 169 F. 582 (6th Cir. 1909); E.G.
Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co., 128 Mich. 591, 87 N.W. 761 (1901). In both cases,
the court emphasized that the increased needs of the buyer/plaintiff were foreseeable
by the parties on the basis of facts known at the time the requirements contracts were
entered into. See also Havighurst & Berman 7 n.27.
101. See, e.g., Crane v. C. Crane & Co., 105 F. 869 (7th Cir. 1901); Nassau
Supply Co. v. Ice Service Co., 252 N.Y. 277, 169 N.E. 383 (Ct. App. 1929); Oscar
Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter Cooper's Glue Factory, 231 N.Y. 459, 132 N.E. 148 (1921).
102. UCC § 2-306, Comment 1 states that subsection (1), specifying the measure
which defines the parties' obligations under open-quantity contracts, "applies to such
contracts of non-producing establishments such as dealers or distributors as well as to
manufacturing concerns." See also note 44 supra and accompanying text. But see
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One of the policies underlying the stricter scrutiny of jobbers' con-
tracts was concern for the extreme ease with which the jobber could
escalate his consumption level under a requirements contract. Indeed,
merely by reducing the price at which he resold an item, the jobber
could significantly increase his requirements and substantially aggravate
the burden of the requirements seller. And with the same ease, the
jobber could reduce his requirements by limiting his promotional ef-
forts or raising his profit margin, perhaps after his seller had expanded
his plant or otherwise relied to his detriment in response to prior require-
ments levels. While there were certainly situations which could dis-
prove the rule, the established manufacturer was less likely to have a
capacity for such ready response to market fluctuations. Before his
consumption level could increase drastically, he would need to make
capital investments for equipment and facilities expansion. Once
made, these were likely not to be readily withdrawn. In short, courts
may have been reluctant to enforce jobber-requirements contracts be-
cause of a desire to shield the requirements seller from an abnormal
increase in his legal obligation."0 3 Implicit in this reluctance is the as-
sumption that it would be unfair for one party to a requirements con-
tract to suddenly and substantially increase the burden of the other.
There are other indications that significantly disproportionate
quantity increases were not favored. This attitude is reflected in dam-
age awards to the quantity-determining party which were limited to the
amount which arises from normal operation of the business rather
than an amount which reflects substantial operational changes.10 '
Comment, supra note 44, at 684, where it is suggested that since the Uniform Commer-
cial Code itself does not eliminate the need for mutuality in requirements contracts, the
possibility remains for a court to use pre-Code judge-made law to invalidate a re-
quirements contract on lack-of-mutuality grounds. See also DUESENBERG & KING
§ 4.05[1], at 4-48 to 4-52.
103. See, e.g., Crane v. C. Crane & Co., 105 F. 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1901), where
the court evidences its concern that the spiral effect of a favorable contract price
negotiated by the jobber at the time the contract was entered into might place an
unreasonable economic burden upon the seller. That is, the better the contract price
is in relation to the current market price, the more the jobber will order and sell; and
the more the jobber can sell, the more competitive he can be; thus, the more he will
order. The Crane reasoning was cited with approval in Cohen v. Clayton Coal Co.,
281 P. 111, 114 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1929). See also Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter
Cooper's Glue Factory, 231 N.Y. 459, 132 N.E. 148 (1921). In Schlegel the
court was concerned that a more than 200 percent increase in the market price of the
glue that was the subject of the requirements contract had stimulated the jobber to so
increase his orders for glue at the lower contract price that a great economic injustice
was visited upon the seller.
104. See Fayette-Kanawha Coal Co. v. Lake & Export Coal Corp., 91 W. Va. 132,
112 S.E. 222 (1922).
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Other courts avoid the Eustis rationale altogether and interpret the
contract so as to limit the obligation imposed to that which would have
been suggested by the conditions which existed at the time of the mak-
ing of the agreement.10 5 Finally, at least one commentator early iden-
tified a judicial tendency toward disapproval of an increase in buyer's
orders in situations where a likely cause of the increase was the fact that
the contracts price was substantially below the market price, thus en-
hancing the buyer's competitive position at the expense of the seller.100
Policy support for limiting quantity increases. If it is assumed
that an important commercial function of an open-quantity contract is
to afford one party an opportunity to control the rate of production in
his operation, it might seem that he should be permitted to rely on the
contract to improve the profitability of his business. The Code clearly
does not attempt to preclude all business expansion. Indeed, Com-
ment 2 is emphatic in its endorsement of "normal" expansion. Doubt
is expressed, however, as to whether "sudden" expansion would be
permitted."0 7 While this distinction is not particularly instructive, it
does suggest that there may be policy reasons for limiting the quantity-
determining party's right to increase the quantity consumed or pro-
duced.
To be sure, such limitation would detract from the utility of the
open-quantity agreement for the party who desires to utilize the con-
tract for ultimate profit maximization, at least to the extent of requir-
ing more attentive draftsmanship.0 " But a legitimate purpose of the
law of commercial transactions is to temper one party's attempt to se-
cure his greatest advantage with concern for the potential impact upon
the party from whom performance can be exacted. If unbridled ex-
pectations are likely to produce considerable economic hardship for one
105. See C.A. Andrews Coal Co. v. Board of Directors of Public Schools, 151 La.
695, 92 So. 303 (1922); Smith v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 260 S.W. 545 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1924). Cf. Asahel Wheeler Co. v. Mandelson, 180 App. Div. 9, 167 N.Y.S.
435 (1917); Moore v. American Molasses Co., 106 Misc. 263, 174 N.Y.S. 440
(1919).
106. See Havighurst & Berman 6 n.20.
107. The specific language in Comment 2 is as follows: "[A] sudden expansion of
the plant by which requirements are to be measured would not be included within the
scope of the contract as made but normal expansion undertaken in good faith would
be within the scope of this section." See note 84 supra.
108. Section 2-306 is supplementary rather than mandatory, see UCC § 1-102(3),
and the quantity-determining party may "draft" his way out of the rigidity of the Code.
For example, a term setting a large maximum quantity limit on quantity may be used
to alert the other party to the probability of a substantial quantity increase during the
contract period. In addition, specific language may be used to give the requirements
buyer or output seller the right to raise the quantity in excess of normal amounts.
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party, the stability of commercial transactions is promoted by a limita-
tion upon the effect of a potentially oppressive contractual term. An
oppressive feature is likely to produce litigation on a wide scale, which
in turn accentuates the lack of definition in the rights secured by a
particular commercial form; resort to a limitation restores definition.
Several reasons support the imposition of a limitation upon quantity in-
creases under open-quantity agreements.
1. Potential for undue advantage. An obvious objection to per-
mitting drastic and relatively sudden increases in quantity is that such
a change is not likely to be anticipated by the party required to sup-
ply requirements or purchase output. This element of surprise, in it-
self, perhaps suggests the desirability of imposing a quantity limitation,
for development of complex economies is, to a significant degree, de-
pendent upon the stability of commercial relationships. But ultimately
there must be inquiry into the risks which each party has assumed to
determine whether the unanticipated detriment is one against which
generalized protection should be afforded.10 9
It can be suggested, of course, that decreases in quantity may be
attended by an element of surprise. But the consequences of that sort
of unanticipated quantity change are less likely to suggest overreaching
or to produce an inequitable distribution of risk than is true where the
variation is an increase in output or requirements. To permit unanti-
cipated disproportionate increases in quantity is to allow one party to
profit at the expense of the other. The quantity-determining party
realizes the benefit of the open-quantity contract, but only by imposing
a potentially onerous burden on the promisee. The output buyer, for
example, may be compelled to accept goods which he may neither
need nor be able to use-or pay the equivalent in damages. Likewise,
in order to supply the requirements buyer with his new level of de-
mand-and afford him the opportunity to profit by his contract-the
requirements seller must either produce his product in significantly
greater quantities, incurring the expense of gearing up for increased
production, or divert the goods from other markets, suffering the possi-
ble loss of goodwill and other detriments. The potential severity of the
impact of an unanticipated disproportionate increase may provide a
sufficient basis to question whether, as a matter of policy, it should be
permitted. The harshness of the result is not only likely to produce
litigation, but also will make strong demands upon the equitable sensi-
109. Cf. Marx v. American Malting Co., 169 F. 582 (6th Cir. 1909); E.G. Dailey
Co. v. Clark Can Co., 128 Mich. 591, 87 N.W. 761 (1901).
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tivities of a court, a feature which portends an inconsistency of decision
potentially destructive of the stability of commercial undertakings in
this area.
In contrast, unanticipated disproportionate decreases in quantity
do not present the same conflict. Rather than raising the possibility
that one party will profit at the expense of the other, a significant de-
crease more often poses the policy question of whether the particular
risk-a market contraction or similar business risk-will be spread be-
tween the two parties or will be left solely with the quantity-determin-
ing party. Neither party will "profit."-" Permitting the decrease will
diffuse the risk and seemingly lessen its total economic impact. This
result is particularly persuasive where market reversals prompt the de-
crease. The quantity-determining party suffers from the condition be-
cause he must accept lower profits. The promisee is also affected, for
his profits will contract upon the loss of a source of demand, if he is a
requirements seller, or of supply, if he is an output buyer. Of course,
some situations in which quantities are decreased cannot be viewed as
involving an equitable distribution of the consequence of adverse eco-
nomic conditions. For example, the requirements buyer may have
eliminated or reduced his orders not as a result of a general business
decline but simply because he found a less expensive substitute product.
Such situations are not immune from judicial scrutiny and the over-
riding requirement of good faith should serve as an adequate basis for
control."
110. See 102 U. PA. L. REv. 654, 665. See also Havighurst & Berman 15.
111. The Southwest Natural Gas case provides an excellent illustration of the role
which good faith can play in cases in which quantity reduction results from the re-
quirements buyer's substitution of a less expensive product. See 102 F.2d 630 (10th
Cir. 1939). On the surface, the case might appear to be one in which the buyer was
attempting to use the open-quantity contract to impose a hardship on the seller. After
purchasing a substantial amount of natural gas from Southwest for a number of years,
the buyer converted to a new source of heat and suddenly reduced his orders to less
than twenty percent of prior orders. The seller could complain that in this attempt by
the buyer to increase the profitability of his operation, it was he, the seller, who was
made to bear the entire economic burden, and that in no sense were buyer and seller
"sharing" the adverse economic consequences. The court correctly looked to the good
faith standard to evaluate the seller's position. Despite the consequence for the seller
of the buyer's substitution, the facts of the case did not suggest that this was a situa-
tion in which the buyer had arbitrarily undercut the seller's expectations in the pursuit
of greater profits. The term of the contract was longer than the anticipated useful
life of the buyer's equipment. Hence, it was reasonable for the parties to assume that
in purchasing replacement equipment, the buyer would take advantage of technological
innovations, such as that which permitted him to utilize a less expensive heat source.
Thus, the court could find that the buyer had satisfied his obligation of good faith.
Had a substitution been made shortly after the contract was entered into or merely
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The point of this analysis is only to suggest that where the quan-
tity-determining party's good faith has been established, sanctioning
abnormal decreases in quantity achieves the salutary result of diffusing
business and market risks, while permitting unusual increases in quan-
tity presents a less defensible potential for one party's profiting to the
extreme detriment of the other. In this sense, then, quantity increases
present a potential for undue advantage not present in other types of
variations.
2. Absence of a natural limitation on fluctuations. As discussed
above, the risk of decreases in quantity is limited by the presence in the
quantity-determining party of a desire for profit maximization. This
feature provides an impetus to that party not to reduce his level of
business. The desire for profitability will often prompt the party to
overcome market difficulties rather than pass them on in the form of
reduced requirements or output. Thus, the desire for profitability-
tempered with the requirement of good faith-serves as a natural lim-
itation upon decreases in quantity and, to the extent it is operative,
lessens the need for more artificial limitations such as that which some
find in section 2-306.112
Increases in requirements are not affected by a similar constraint.
Indeed, the desire for profit maximization may have the opposite effect
of encouraging constantly larger levels of requirements consumption or
output production. Given other favorable conditions, the quantity-
determining party will seek to decrease his marginal unit costs, and
hence increase his profits, by increasing the number of units which he
produces. If, for example, the quantity-determining party has unused
production potential at the time of contracting, he would be inclined
to maximize the return of capital and other resources to the extent
that market conditions would permit. $Since these pressures for en-
largement are not naturally suppressed, there may be a need for arti-
ficial limitations. At a minimum, the absence of a natural limitation
on increases makes this form of variation a more appropriate subject of
statutory control.
3. Absence of interference with business judgment. The thesis
has been developed that a capacity to decrease quantities, restrained
only by the requirement of good faith, is desirable because it preserves
because the market price of other fuels had decreased, the result would undoubtedly
have been different. A major attraction of the good faith concept is the capacity
which it affords for recognizing these distinctions.
112. See HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 1966);
28 CoLuM. L. Ruv. 223, 224, n.8. See generally note 54 supra.
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to the quantity-determining party relative freedom to exercise his busi-
ness judgment in the operation of his facility. It is posited that a party
who entered an open-quantity agreement is not likely to have relin-
quished the right to decrease requirements or output in response to
business or market conditions.'" 3 Because flexibility in effectuating
business judgment is likely to be a fundamental concern of the party
who has chosen not to accept a fixed-quantity obligation, a statutory
interpretation which significantly inhibits it must be suspect.
Alleviation of the harsh consequences of an unexpected, abnormal
increase in quantity, however, need not be subverted to an overriding
concern for the preservation of business judgment, for a limitation
upon disproportionate increases represents a less disruptive intrusion
upon that fundamental precept. A requirements buyer, for example,
can continue to operate his business so as to maximize profit even if
his requirements seller is not required to meet disproportionately in-
creased needs. The buyer is simply forced to look elsewhere for his
supplies. While alternative sources may not be as desirable in terms
of price or quality, the buyer is left free to attempt to minimize a dis-
parity through negotiation or substitution. He continues in full control
of his business and resources, with the means to overcome the conse-
quences of an artificial limitation on variations under his open-quantity
contract.
In the final analysis, the relative absence of impact upon business
judgment may not stand alone as a reason for imposing a limitation
upon quantity increases. It does suggest, however, the rationality of a
rule which differentiates between types of quantity variations; and it
does influence the decision to impose a limitation, since that conclusion
represents a balancing of the relative impact of the result upon buyer
and seller. While decreases in quantity have potentially harsh conse-
quences for the requirements seller or output buyer, there can appro-
priately be a paramount concern for the quantity-determining party's
control of his business. Since the concern for intrusions upon business
control is not as compelling where quantity increases are involved, the
need to alleviate the potential for undue advantage should, in that con-
text, be given greater weight.
CONCLUSION
A thesis of this discussion is that the interpretation of section
2-306 should be undertaken with proper deference to the principles
113. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra. See also Note, Business Practices
and the Flexibility of Long-Term Contracts, 36 VA. L. REv. 627 (1950).
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which have been developed in the numerous pre-Code decisions involv-
ing open-quantity contracts. Any attempt to introduce fundamental
redirection of those developments must sustain a heavy burden in es-
tablishing the defects of the prior trends. From all the evidence which
appears on the face of the Code, the drafters did not purport to under-
take that task. Although the Code text and, more particularly, the
Comments are susceptible to an interpretation which introduces a basic
revision of prior law, that result was apparently not intended. Prop-
erly read, section 2-306 operates as a codification of both the good
faith standard and an equitable limitation on the extent to which quan-
tities can be increased by the quantity-determining party. While the
latter feature had not been fully developed in the common law deci-
sions, this is in large part due to the relatively few cases which pre-
sented the issue and does not necessarily reflect a judicial hesitancy to
accept the wisdom of that limitation. Indeed, there are indications
that the courts were sensitive to the burden which a drastic increase in
quantity might impose.114
It is feasible to regard the suggested interpretation of the Code as
leaving the requirements seller or output buyer vulnerable to over-
reaching by the quantity-determining party who finds it advantageous
to reduce suddenly the level of his consumption or output. However,
that concern fails to take account of the substantial role which the good
faith standard can play in the resolution of controversies under sec-
tion 2-306. Prior to the Code, the good faith criteria provided the
basic interpretive tool in cases involving open-quantity contracts. It
proved quite adequate as a basis for distinguishing situations in which
the quantity-determining party was merely pursuing a better bargain
elsewhere from those in which a change in needs or output resulted
from the exercise of the business judgment which the quantity-deter-
mining party had reserved for himself. It should not be expected that
the good faith requirement will play a different, or less significant role
under the Code. This article, therefore, has suggested that section
2-306 be read to leave that standard unfettered by a proportional
limitation on quantity reductions, the type of variation which appears
most frequently in litigation.
In particular situations a party may properly be concerned that
the good faith criterion is too indefinite to offer the protection which
he needs. If his acceptance of an open-quantity contract requires a
substantial commitment of new capital and other resources, he may
114. See notes 104 and 105 supra and accompanying text,
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desire an assurance that he will have an opportunity to secure a return
from his investment The interpretation suggested here does not limit
his options in providing that security. It can be expected that the par-
ties will be mindful of the Code's invitation to modify its basic rules
by agreement and that alternatives, such as a minimum-maximum
quantity-term, will be considered. The function of the Code should
only be to provide general rules which will operate when the parties
have otherwise not been specific .in defining the contours of their agree-
ment. In attempting to deal with these situations, it is appropriate for
the Code to draw heavily on principles which admit of considerable
flexibility. With respect to section 2-306, this is achieved by de-em-
phasizing the role of an objective quantity limitation and re-establishing
the predominance of the good faith criteria.
